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In this thesis, we consider a supply chain problem with one supplier and one 
retailer where the retailer is facing financial constraints. We examine the 
optimal decisions of the retailer and the supplier under different financing 
schemes, such as bank loan or trade credit. 
We analytically characterize the retailer's best response under the multi-
period setting and illustrate the supplier's optimal decisions in the simplified 
single period problem. We also demonstrate the impacts of different financing 
sources on the supply chain performance. Our numerically studies show that 
as long as the default risk of the capital constrained retailer is sufficiently 
low, the supply chain can achieve a higher total profit under the trade credit 
policy than under the bank loan scheme. 
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A supply chain is a network of partners that produces raw materials, sub-
assemblies, and then distributes the finished products to end customers. 
Along this chain, there are three major flows: material, information, and 
capital. The traditional research of supply chain management has long fo-
cused on the flows of materials and information to improve supply chain effi-
ciencies —sharply reduced lead times, lower inventories, more collaboration 
on planning and forecasting and improved customer service, while ignoring 
the capital flows. Most of the prior studies almost inevitably assume that 
there is sufficient working capital available. In reality, however, there are 
many situations in which suppliers or retailers are facing capital constraints 
and therefore limited in their operational decisions. An important case arises 
when a firm is the small-sized or nascent. For example, PenAgain, which is a 
small pen making firm started by two young 34-year old entrepreneurs, strug-
gled with a copious orders (over 470,000 units) from Wal-Mart because of 
the lack of budget. For complementary reasons, financial crisis and economic 
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downturns are also a lead to firms' illiquidity. In these circumstances, the 
supply chain management neglecting the financial constraints is not sound 
enough to carry out its function, which exercises negative influence over the 
overall supply chain performance. One natural question arises, "what are 
the impacts of capital constraints on the supply chain?" 
In the presence of capital constraints, firms usually finance to maintain 
their daily operations. According to the report by Aberdeen Research, sup-
ply chain finance is gaining in more and more importance. Around 74% of 
respondent corporations have already introduced or planning to do supply 
chain finance to optimize both the material and financial flows within the 
supply chain. An obvious financing source is through short-term loans or 
corporate bonds from third-party financial institutions, such as banks. For 
example, Motorola, a fortune 100 company, had $9,775 billion in equity while 
$15,825 billion in debt in 2009. However, SMEs (Small and Medium Enter-
prises) usually have limited access to short-term bank loan or been offered a 
relatively high interest rate, as a result of their lack of collateral and the ten-
uous nature of their business establishment (Vandenberg 2003). They resort 
to factors or trade credit financing to fund their operations. Not only the 
nascent or SMEs, according to the first report on the supply chain finance 
published by Demica, 73% of large European corporations are looking to ex-
tend payment terms with their suppliers in order to conserve cash. In the UK, 
63% of companies overall are trying to extend credit, compared with 48% in 
Germany. On the other hand, suppliers are eager to sell their products to 
the intermediaries and end-customers. Due to the harmful effects on supply 
2 
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chain performance resulted from capital constraints, many suppliers are will-
ing to collaborate with the retailers financially. In reality, allowing retailers 
to delay payment for goods already delivered is a common business practice 
(Peterson and Rajan 1997). For example, Wal-Mart, a fortune 500 Corpora-
tion, uses trade credit as a preferable financing source. In its balance sheet 
on January, 2009, Wal-Mart had $28.8 billion accounts payable amounting 
to 75% of its total inventory. In addition, Hewlett-Packard (referred to as . 
HP), IBM, Sony etc., all provide trade credit financing to their distributors 
or resellers. Especially for HP, the financing of its products could equal up to 
100% of the value of the borrower's inventory (Zhou and Groenevelt 2007). 
One advantage of using trade credit to mitigate the impacts of financial lim-
itations is that as an inter-supply chain contract, the amount of debt and 
the timing of payback is closely related to the timing of procurement and 
selling such that the retailer will face lower pressure from paying back the 
debt before his profit is realized. 
Banking financing and trade credit financing differ in two main aspects. 
One is the party who takes the credit risk. Due to the uncertainty of demand, 
it is possible that the borrower cannot fully pay off the debt and in this 
circumstance, the debt holder will bear some loss. The other one is the 
flexibility for the supplier. In trade credit financing, the supplier decides 
both the early payment discount and the wholesale price such that she has 
the opportunity to balance her profit and the corresponding credit risk. On 
the other hand, in bank financing scheme, the supplier offers a traditional 
wholesale price contract in which the retailer must pay in advance. 
These differences bring several interesting problems to the forefront of 
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managing capital constrained supply chain: What is the optimal wholesale 
price under a trade credit or a bank financing scheme? What are the impacts 
of different financing channels on the borrower's operational decisions, supply 
chain efficiency and the profits of each player? 
To answer the above questions, we set up a capital constrained supply-
chain model with one supplier and one capital constrained retailer under 
three different financing schemes: basic setting - capital constrained without 
financing; bank loan setting - bank financing scheme; and trade credit set-
ting -supplier financing scheme. After reviewing the literature related to this 
thesis in Chapter 2, we describe the models in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we 
study the retailer's problem for a given wholesale price and bank loan/trade 
credit interest rate. We demonstrate that, in the presence of bank loan or 
trade credit, the retailer's optimal ordering quantity may not be monotone 
in his initial budget. We also extend this problem to a two-period setting. 
Under the assumption that the demand has a log-concave density, we show 
the the retailer's profit function is still unimodal in his ordering quantity and 
financial decision. In Chapter 5，we introduce the mathematical formulation 
and show the results from the supplier's perspective. We show that in the 
basic setting where the retailer is unable to raise fund, the supplier's profit is 
unimodal, while in the bank loan and trade credit case, the supplier's objec-
tive function has at most two modes. In Chapter 6，numerical experiments 
are conducted to demonstrate our analytical results and generate more man-
agerial insights. We find that if the interest rate of bank loan and trade credit 
are the same and exogenously given, then there is no dominating financial 
scheme for the retailer. For the supply chain, its total profit is much larger • 
4 
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when the retailer can seek external financing than that when the retailer can 
not. Finally, we summarize our main findings and propose several future 




Our model relates to three bodies of literature. In §2.1, we review the liter-
ature on models related to operations and finance interface; in §2.2，we go 
over the literature on trade credit, and the papers related to supply chain 
contracts are listed in §2.3. 
2.1 Operations and Finance Interface 
2.1.1 Single Period Setting 
Recently, a growing trend towards jointly considering financial and oper-
ational decisions has arisen in the operations management community. An 
early semina working paper by Xu and Birge (2004) brings capital constraints 
into a traditional newsvendor model. Their model focuses on the operational 
and financial decisions of the capital constrained retailer, and demonstrates 
how a firm's operational decisions are influenced by the financial constraints 
under its optimal capital structure. They first show that capital structure 
6 
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has no influence on the production decisions in a perfect market, which fol-
lows from the Modigliani and Miller (1958)'s theory (This is the seminal work 
in capital structure which shows that a firm's investment and financial deci-
sions can be made separately, referred to as the M&M theory). Then their 
work reveals the importance of making production and financial decisions si-
multaneously by demonstrating the significant impacts of misidentifying the 
company's optimal leverage ratio on the firm's value. Another work by D i n g , . 
et al. (2004) also studies an integrated operational and financial model. They 
focus on the hedging decisions faced by a global company who sells to both 
home and foreign markets. Our work is distinguished from theirs by focusing 
on the whole supply chain rather than the financial constrained retailer. 
Buzacott and Zhang (2004) investigate a model incorporating asset-based 
financing into production decisions. They first introduce a multi-period in-
ventory model with deterministic demands to explore the relationship be-
tween finance and operations via the integrations between systems to control 
the material flows and cash flows. Then they study a Stackelberg game be-
tween a capital-constrained newsvendor and a bank, who makes a lending 
decision based on the retailers' assets which are monitored by their balance 
sheet and associated accounts. Their work suggests that banks are better 
off using asset-based financing with appropriately chosen parameters, while 
retailers are able to enhance their cash return over what it would be if the 
retailers only use their own capital. Dada and Hu (2008) study a similar 
problem which analyzes the game between a bank and a capital constrained 
retailer. They show that if the cost of borrowing is not too high, in the Stack-
elberg game equilibrium, the capital-constrained newsvendor borrows funds 
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to order to an inventory level which is lower than the traditional newsven-
dor's optimal ordering amount, and the bank charges an interest rate which 
decreases in the initial capital level of the newsvendor. 
In some recent working papers, researchers start to look at how financial 
constraints and sources influence the supply chain performance. Lai et al. 
(2009) consider a financial constrained supply chain operating under different 
modes: preorder mode, consignment mode and the combination of these two. 
In their model, the supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the retailer. 
They show that if the supplier is capital constrained, the combination mode 
is preferred because the inventory investment sharing between the supplier 
and the retailer can lower the inventory risk. Caldentey and Haugh (2009) 
study the performance of a stylized "selling to the newsvendor" model with 
a retailer whose profit partially depends on a financial market. In their work, 
the supplier offers a list of supply contracts identifying the execution time and 
the wholesale prices. The retailer makes decision on the time for executing 
the contract. Specifically, in the flexible contract with hedging, the retailer 
does have access to financial markets, so he can dynamically trade in the 
financial market to mitigate the effects of capital constraints. They extend 
the existing literature by including financial markets as a source of public 
information upon which procurement contracts can be written, and a way of 
financial hedging to mitigate the effects of capital constraints. 
Babich et al. (2006) also study a single period financial constrained supply 
chain problem. The manufacturer can finance externally or borrow from the 
suppliers by trade credit. In their model, the financial decision of the capital 
constrained manufacturer is to decide how many suppliers to contract w i t h . ‘ 
8 
I 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
They show that different financing sources, such as bank loans and trade 
credit, are substitutable so that the firm contracts with more suppliers if 
bank financing is not available. Different from our model, the wholesale 
prices in the supply contracts are exogenously given in their work. 
The papers by Caldentey and Chen (2008)，Yang and Birge (2009), Zhou 
and Groenevelt (2007) and Kouvelis and Zhao (2009) are most related to 
our simplified single period problem. They all consider a two-echelon supply . 
chain in which the retailer is capital constrained, and exam the supply chain 
performance under different short-term supply contracts. 
In Caldentey and Chen (2008), they consider two financing schemes for 
the capital constrained retailer. One is "internal financing" in which the 
supplier collects only a fraction of the wholesale price when the contract is 
signed, and receives the remaining payment after the demand is realized. 
This contract is slightly different from ours. In their financing scheme, the 
supplier sets an asset-based credit limit and the retailer receives zero interest 
loans from the supplier, while in our model the supplier charges interest for 
the delayed payment. The other financing scheme is "external financing" in 
which a bank offers loans to the retailer. The bank sets an interest rate based 
on a competitive financial market. They show that in most instances both 
the supplier and the retailer are better off by using internal financing than 
by relying on external financing. In addition, the value of offering internal 
financing decreases in the retailer's initial capital level. 
Yang and Birge (2009) study a stylized single period supply chain problem 
in which the cash constrained retailer has multiple financing sources. Facing 
a trade credit contract, the retailer finances his inventory using a portfolio of 
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initial cash, trade credit and short-term loans. They demonstrate that trade 
credit plays an essential role to act as a risk-sharing mechanism and provides 
some empirical evidence to support their conclusion. 
In the bank financing schemes mentioned above, the supplier is not con-
nected to the bank. While in Zhou and Groenevelt (2008), the supplier teams 
up with a bank, offers interest-free loans to the capital constrained retailer 
and pays interests for the retailer. The bank only sets a credit limit of the 
loan based on the retailer's assets. In their model, the interest rate is ex-
ogenous given. They also investigate open account financing in which the 
supplier allows partially delayed payment, which is equivalent to offering a 
loan to the retailer. Their numerical results lead to the conclusion that the 
joint supplier and bank financing is preferable to open account financing for 
the entire supply chain. 
In Kouvelis and Zhao (2009), they exam the impacts of different financing 
schemes in the presence of bankruptcy risk on a capital constrained retailer. 
Their bank financing setting follows Xu and Birge's in which the loan in-
terests are priced at the risks involved, therefore, the retailer's operational 
and financial decisions can be made separately in their model. They draw 
a conclusion that it is in the supplier's best interest to offer credits to the 
retailer at an interest rate which is less than or equal to the risk free interest 
rate, and the retailer will always prefer to finance from the supplier rather 
than the bank if the optimal structured financing scheme is offered. Different 
from their model, we assume the interest rate is exogenous given, and as a re-
sult, the retailer's best response is much more complicated (since operational 
and financial decisions cannot be made separately). Under our assumptions, • 
10 
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if the retailer's financial constraint is sufficiently tight, the supply chain is 
better off in bank loan case since the high bankruptcy risk is shifted to an 
external institution. 
2.1.2 Multi-Period Setting 
Besides the single period models mentioned above, there are also several 
works studying topics on operations and finance interface under the inulti- ‘ 
period setting. Li, et al. (2005) (first draft in 1997) present a multi-period 
model in which the objective is to maximize the expected present value of 
shareholders' dividends by simultaneously deciding operational and financial 
decisions. The firm's decisions include dividends, capital subscriptions, short-
term borrowing and physical inventories. In their model, the discount rate 
and interest rate for the bank loan are exogenous given. They show the 
optimality of myopic policy and characterize the base-stock level explicitly 
in the special case of linear inventory and default cost. They also conclude 
that in this case, the base-stock level in a dividend-maximizing firm is lower 
than that in a profit-maximizing firm. Hu and Sobel (2007) study a Clark 
and Scarf multi-echelon extension of Li et al (2005). They provide a counter-
example to show that there is no optimal echelon base-stock policy in the 
presence of financial constraints in a supply chain system with two or more 
echelons. 
Chao et al. (2008) consider a multi-period periodic-review inventory con-
trol problem in which the replenishment decisions of the retailer are con-
strained by cash flow (they focus on the lost sale case). In their model, the re-
tailer is self-financing and therefore he is unable to raise external fund. They 
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show the optimality of a capital-dependent base-stock policy and present an 
algorithm for computing the optimal base stock level for each period. An-
other work of Chao et al. (2008) addresses the borrowing and lending actions 
in their model. They make assumptions as follows. If the retailer has insuffi-
cient cash, then he can borrow from the bank. On the other hand, if he has 
some cash leftover after the orders are placed, he should deposit it. Similar 
to their previous work, they show that the capital-dependent base-stock pol-
icy is optimal in the presence of lending and borrowing. Different from their 
papers, our model places emphasis on the entire supply chain rather than 
only on the financial constrained retailer. 
Xu and Birge (2006) propose an integrated corporate planning model 
which considers an optimization-based valuation framework to make pro-
duction and financial decisions simultaneously. They develop an efficient al-
gorithm to solve the integer stochastic programming problem with nonlinear 
constraints and demonstrate the importance of jointly considering financial 
and production decisions. 
It is also worth mentioning several related research investigating the op-
erations and finance interface. Hu and Sobel (2005) examine the interdepen-
dence of a firm's capital structure and its short-term operational decisions 
concerning inventories, dividends and liquidity. In their model, the firm's 
objective is to maximize the expected present value of dividends. They con-
clude that the optimal inventory policy is independent on the firm's financial 
leverage, and the optimal capital structure consists of only debt or equity 
depending on the financial parameters. In most of these models, it is the re-
tailer who is facing financial constraint while the supplier is not. In contrast , ‘ 
12 
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Babich (2007) studies the situation where the manufacturer is stronger than 
the supplier financially. He answers the question that whether it is profitable 
to give financial subsidies to the weaker supplier, when the supplier is facing 
financial problems. 
2.2 Trade Credit 
Besides operations and finance interface, our paper also addresses the effects 
of trade credit in supply chain management. Years ago, people have already 
noticed the importance of trade credit. In Peterson and Rajan (1997), they 
state that trade credit is a very important financing source in short-term 
for the companies in United State. They find that firms with less oppor-
tunities to raise bank loans are more likely to take early payment discount. 
Giannetti and Burkart (2007) also demonstrate this importance empirically 
from the operational and marketing point of view. They reveal that trade 
credit can not only help retailer as a financing source, but also provide the 
supplier informational advantage. Several studies have considered this issue. 
For example, Haley and Higgins (1973), study the relationship between in-
ventory policy and trade credit policy in an EOQ model. In their model, the 
retailer decides not only the ordering quantity but also the time for payment. 
Aggarwal and Jaggi (1995) study an EOQ model of deteriorating products 
under a p e r m i s s i b l e -delay-payments scheme. Carlson et al. (1996) investi-
gate an EOQ model under both all-units and incremental-quantity discounts 
on date-terms supplier credit. Date-terms is a trade credit scheme which 
allows the amount of supplier credit received to vary with the timing of the 
13 
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purchase. Recently, Gupta and Wang (2009) present a discrete time, joint 
inventory-financing model with stochastic demand. They show that in the 
presence of trade credit, the order-up-to inventory policy is still optimal and 
they provide an algorithm for finding the optimal base-stock level in a con-
tinuous review model. Other related works include Chapman et aL (1984) 
and Huang (2003). 
2.3 Supply Chain Contracts 
In our model, the only contract term is the wholesale price. In current 
literature, several types of supply chain contracts have been studied for sup-
ply chain management problems with two echelons. For example, the buy 
back contracts (Pasternack 1985), the revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and 
Lariviere 2003), .etc. A detailed review is provided by Cachon (2002). Van 
Mieghem (1999) values the effects of subcontracting in improving financial 
performance and coordinating of the supply chain by analyzing a stochastic 
investment game between two competing players. He shows that a state-
dependent contract can coordinate not only production decisions but also 
capacity investment decisions. Cachon (2004) also studies the allocation of 
inventory risk in supply chain under three different contracts: push, pull and 
a d v a n c e -purchase discount contracts. In push and pull contracts, the retailer 
and the supplier, who holds the inventory, bears the inventory risk respec-
tively. While in advance-purchase discount contract, two wholesale prices are 
provided and the risk is shared between the retailer and the supplier. He con-
cludes that under the consideration of advance-purchase discount contract , . 
14 
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the supply chain can be coordinated and its profit can be allocated arbitrar-
ily. Similar to our work, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) consider a price-only 
supply chain contract and examine how supply chain performance, including 
the retailer's price sensitivity and the wholesale price, depends on the rela-
tive variability (i.e., the coefficient of variation) of demand. This setting has 
been extended by Bernstein et al. (2006) to a two-echelon case with a net-
work of retailers who compete with each other by selecting sales quantities. 
They identify a sufficient condition, refer to as echelon operational autonomy 
(EOA), under which perfect coordination is feasible through simple whole-
sale pricing contract. The papers discuss supply chain coordination with risk 
of random demand are referred to Choi et al. (2008) and Qi et al. (2004). 
Papers studying supply chain contracts are numerous, our work is comple-




This section is organized as follows. In §3.1’ we introduce the notation, 
present the model and the assumptions we make. After that, in §3.2，we 
discuss the specific properties of demand distribution we need in our model. 
3.1 Model Description 
We consider a two-period supply chain problem where the supply chain con-
sists only one supplier (with pronoun "she") and one retailer (with pronoun 
"he"), between whom a single type of goods is produced and transferred. 
We assume that both the supplier and the retailer are in a quantity com-
petitive industry and risk-neutral, which means they only concern about the 
expected return and are completely indifferent to the risk involved. Different 
from the classical supply chain problems, we focus on the situation where the 
retailer is facing a financial constraint. We will analyze this problem under 
three different settings: the basic setting, in which the capital constrained . 
retailer is unable to raise any external funds; the bank loan setting, where 
16 
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the retailer is allowed to raise short-term loan from a bank (or other finan-
cial institutions); the trade credit setting, as the words imply, in which the 
retailer can trade with the supplier based on credit. 
3.1.1 The Basic Setting 
In the basic setting, the retailer faces a financial constraint and is unable 
to raise fund through a financial institution (e.g. a bank) or extend credit • 
from the supplier. This may happen when the retailer is a new entrant to 
this industry. Figure 3.1 illustrates the sequence of events in this setting. 
Specifically, at the beginning of the first period, the supplier proposes a 
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wholesale price contract, which identifies the wholesale price in each period 
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(we denote as w in our model). For simplicity, we assume the wholesale 
prices are identical between two periods. Note that similar results can be 
obtained if the wholesale prices are different between two time periods, and 
they are decided in the beginning of the first period. Based on the contract 
the retailer determines an ordering quantity in the first period, we denote 
as Qi. Note that the retailer is facing a financial constraint and unable to 
raise any external fund. Suppose his initial capital level is k, it is obvious 
the retailer cannot order more than k/w units of product. The supplier then 
starts to produce the products at a unit cost c and receives the payment for 
the transaction in the first period. At the same time, the products produced 
are delivered to the retailer, who sells them at a market price p > (1 + r , ) c 
in this period, where r! is the risk-free interest rate for one period of trading. 
Without loss of generality, we assume 77 = 0 in our model, that is, we ignore 
the time value of money. , 
We assume the demands Di,i = 1,2 in these two periods are independent 
and identically distributed with probability density function /(•). Unless 
otherwise noted, we assume the support of Di is [0,+oo). After the realiza-
tion of the demand in the first period, the retailer sells mm{Qi ,Di ) units of 
product and receives the revenue. Unsatisfied demand is lost. In the sec-
ond period, the decision process of the retailer stays the same except the 
initial capital is updated from k to including the realized profit of the first 
period. To simplify the problem, we assume the products are perishable or 
fashion goods without salvage value, which means all leftover inventory is 
salvaged at price 0. In addition, we assume that all unmet demand is lost, 
and no additional penalty cost is incurred. In the later analysis, we illustrate ‘ 
18 
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that depending on the tightness of the capital constrains, the effects of the 
financial constraint can be significant. 
3.1.2 The Bank Loan Setting 
In reality, firms facing financial constraints can often raise funds from banks 
to finance their operations. We assume the capital constrained retailer is 
able to finance additional unsecured debt B from a bank at an interest r > 0 . 
and this financing scheme is only allowed at the beginning of the first period. 
Moreover, in the situation where the retailer raises a loan, the marginal 
revenue of selling a product should be more than the marginal cost, i.e., 
p > w{l + r)^i = 1，2 as otherwise, the retailer should not borrow any money 
to finance his ordering. Figure 3.2 illustrates the sequence of events in this 
setting. When the first selling season starts, the retailer receives the loan B 
and fully pays off the procurement cost to the supplier by his on-hand cash 
and the loan. The term of the loan is two periods, thus the retailer has to 
repay both the principal and the interest, that is, (1 + r)^B to the bank at 
the end of the second period, and receives the residual revenue, if any. If 
unfortunately, the demand is too little, and the retailer cannot fully pay off 
the loan, then he gets zero revenue while the bank, who is the debt-holder 
in this setting, pays the bankruptcy costs and receives the residual revenue. 
3.1.3 The Trade Credit Setting 
It is often assumed the retailer must fully pay off the procurement cost once 
the order is received. However, allowing retailers to delay payment for goods 
already delivered is a common business practice. And the retailers, especially 
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Figure 3.2: Sequence of Events - the Bank Loan Setting 
small businesses, rely on this practice as a source of short-term funds since 
most of them have a limited number of financing opportunities. Figure 3.3 
illustrates the sequence of events in this setting. At the beginning of each 
selling season, the retailer places an order and pays the procurement cost 
partially. Similar to the basic setting, this early payment must satisfy the 
capital constraint. After the revenue is realized, the retailer has to pay 
the rest plus some interest. Because we ignore the time value of money, the 
retailer will always pay the supplier all the cash he has upon delivery to lower 
the marginal cost. Mathematically, if the operational decision of the retailer 
is constrained by his financial status wQ > k, he pays all his on-hand cash k 
to the supplier and receives Q units of product, and the remainder {wQ-ky 
is considered to be a kind of loan, so both the principal and interest must 
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Figure 3.3: Sequence of Events - the Trade Credit Setting 
be paid in full at the end of the second period. Such a financing scheme is 
almost identical as the traditional "early payment discount", i.e. the retailer 
can pay early (before the products are delivered) to get a discount price, 
or he can pay the full wholesale price after sales. Note that in the bank 
loan setting, the retailer only has a single opportunity to do financing, and 
therefore, he may borrow some capital for future use. While in the trade 
credit case, the retailer can finance in both periods and as a result, he only 
borrows just enough to cover the procurement cost, i.e., Bi = {wQi — A )^+, 
i = 1,2. 
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3.2 Demand Distribution Properties 
Let random variable Di be the demand in period i,i = 1,2. The probabil-
ity density function (PDF) of Di is /(•)，cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) is F[-) and complimentary CDF is F{-). We will make the following 
assumptions about F(.) throughout the thesis. 
Assumption 3.2.1. The demand distribution function F{-) satisfies the fol-
lowing properties: 
(i) F{-) is dijferentiable, strictly increasing and F{0) = 0，F(+oo) = 1. 
(ii) Di has a finite mean, and 
(iii) its failure rate function h{-) = f{-)/F{-) is increasing. 
Definition 3.2.1. Let X be a nonnegative random variable with distribu-
tion F. X has a convex increasing failure rate (CIFR) and F is an CIFR 
distribution if h{^) is increasing in the weak sense, and convex for all ^ such 
that F ( 0 < 1. 
Among the commonly used distributions, it can be shown that Uniform, 
Exponential, Normal, and Beta {a > l)distributions are CIFR while in gen-
eral, Gamma distributions is not. 
Definition 3.2.2. A function g is said to be log-concave on the interval (a, b) 
if the function ln^ is a concave function on (a, 6), which is to say that 
• l ) . " ( X 2 ) — ^ ^ ^ ) 2 . 
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In some of our theoretical results, we need the density function of demand 
to be log-concave. A list of log-concave distributions is given in the appendix. 
Note that if a random variable has a log-concave density function, then it 
has an increasing failure rate. 
Remark 3.2.1. Throughout the thesis we interpret function properties such 




In this chapter, we analyze the problem from the retailer's perspective. In 
§4.1’ we present the single period model and characterize the retailer's op-
timal strategy under different situations. After that, in §4.2, §4.3 and §4.4, 
we present the two-period model formulations and the results we obtain in 
the basic setting, in the bank loan setting and in the trade credit setting, 
respectively. 
4.1 The Single Period Problem 
To set the stage for the later analysis of the two-period problem, we first 
present the model and results in the single-period case in this section. 
We consider a supply chain where a retailer has a single opportunity to 
place an order to satisfy the stochastic demand D which is realized at the 
end of the selling season. This model is essentially a classical newsvendor 
problem with financial constraints k. Suppose the retailer is a new entrant 
to the market and has limited financing opportunity. Therefore, for any 
24 
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given wholesale price w, the retailer's ordering quantity Q is constrained 
by Q < k/w and he may not always be able achieve his targeted ordering 
quantity. Figure 4.1 illustrates the cash flow in this setting. 







Figure 4.1: Cash Flow - Single Period Basic Setting 
To find the optimal ordering quantity Q, the retailer's optimization prob-
lem is 
max E \p min{Q, D} - wQ + A;1, (4.1.1) Q L 
s.t. 0 < wQ < k. ‘ 
As it is not hard to show the retailer's profit function is concave and therefore 
the retailer's optimal ordering quantity Q*{w) is determined as follows: 
Q*{w) = m i n l ^ Q o , ^ Y (4.1.2) 
where Qo = F ' ^ ( ^ ^ ) . 
If Qo < k/w, the financial constraint does not affect the optimal opera-
tional strategy; otherwise, the retailer can only use up his capital and order 
k/w units. 
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In other situations, firms facing financial constraints can often raise funds 
from banks to support their operations. We assume the capital constrained 
retailer is able to finance additional unsecured debt B from a bank at an 
interest T<i > 0. When the selling season starts, the retailer receives the loan 
B and fully pays off the procurement cost to the supplier by his initial cash 
and the loan. At the end of the selling season, the retailer repays (1 + r2)B 
of his revenue to the bank and receives the residual revenue, if any. If the 
retailer cannot fully pay off the loan, he gets zero revenue while the bank 
receives all the residual revenue. Figure 4.2 illustrates the cash flow in this 
setting. 




L U • 
‘ t 
I • 
wQ B{l + r) 
Figure 4.2: Cash Flow - Single Period Bank Loan Setting 
Thus, the retailer's optimization problem is 
r 1 + 
max E pmm{Q,D)-wQ-rB + k ， (4.1.3) 
Q,B [ 
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In (4.1.3), we also ignore the time value of on-hand cash. It is easy to jus-
tify that, if the retailer decides to raise fund, he will only borrow just enough 
money to cover the procurement cost, i.e., B = (wQ - k)^ at optimum. 
The following lemma identifies the optimal ordering quantity and debt 
level with initial capital k. 
Lemma 4.1.1. (Buzacott and Zhang, 2004) The optimal ordering quantity 
of the retailer when he can borrows from the bank is • 
‘ k 
Qo(w), ifQo{w) < -; 
w 
QlH = 么 ’ # - i f — "(i + d) < - < Q�w; (4-i-4) 
w \ p / w 
Q(w), otherwise, 
\ 
. _ . - ({wQ 一 k)(l + r)\ , , 
where Q(w) satisfies pF{Q) = w{l + r)F I ^ ~ ~ ^ I , and the re-
sulting level of debt is 
f o , W ( " ( i + r ) ) d ? 
B*(w) = � P ) 切 ( 4 . 1 . 5 ) 
/N 
wQ{w) — k, otherwise. 
V 
We would like to point out that, as we do not consider the salvage value of 
the remaining inventory at the retailer, the optimal solution is slightly simpler 
than that in Buzacott and Zhang (2004). In the first case of (4.1.4), the 
capital level of the retailer is relatively high so that the financial constraint 
becomes redundant and the retailer purchases the desired ordering quantity 
by his internal fund. While in the second case, the retailer just uses up his 
equity k. This may occur when the interest rate is too high so that it is not 
profitable to raise a loan. Alternatively, if the interest rate is sufficiently low, 
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then after using up his internal capital, the retailer would seek additional 
fund to order Q. 
It can be observed from (4.1.3) that the retailer's optimal profit is decreas-
ing in w. Intuitively, if the suppler offers a higher wholesale price, the retailer 
should always be worse off regardless whether he is capital constrained or not. 
One may expect that Q{w) is always less than or equal to unconstrained so-
lution Qo as the retailer should order less if he needs to raise fund for his 
ordering expenses. However, the following result shows that this may not be 
true sometimes. 
^ ., 1 \ -f{wQo{w)-k){l^r)\ 
Proposition 4.1.2. For given w, if y ^ > t |^ j , 
then Q{w) > Qo{w). 
Proof. For given w, if the retailer’ internal cash level is high, i.e., k/w > 
QQ{w), then the retailer orders exactly Qo(w). So it is only possible to order 
more than the unconstrained case when the retailer raises an external fund. 
In that case, the retailer's optimization problem can be rewritten as 
maocnJ(Q) 二 p 广 �xdF{x) + pQF{Q) — B(1 + r)F ( ( 务 ？ … ) ) _ k, 
Q>0 r � � ^ J ( w Q - k ) ( l + r ) \ p ) 
— P 
which is unimodal in Q (see Buzacott and Zhang 2004). So the optimal 
ordering decision, Q{w) is determined by the first order condition 
譬 = 和 _ ( 赤 - 响 - ： ， = 。 . 
The optimal ordering quantity is more than the unconstrained case, that is, 
Q{w) > Qo{w) if and only if dU.^^{Qo)/dQo > 0, which can be simplified as 
^ 1 〉 0 0 1 〉 ( 時 （ ( " 1 華 ’ ’ • 
dQo _ _ � ) V P J 
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where F(Qo) = w/p. 口 
when the loan rate is sufficiently low, the condition in (4.1.2) is satisfied 
because the complementary cumulative distribution function is always less 
than one. This means if the retailer borrows cash with little extra cost, he 
would order more because the more inventory on hand, the more market 
demands the retailer can capture. Similarly, if the unit price of the products 
is sufficiently low, it is also very likely that the condition is satisfied and the 
retailer tends to order more. Intuitively, when the selling price is sufficiently 
low, the probability of the retailer's bankruptcy is relatively high and the 
retailer will be so desperate that orders even more than the unconstrained 
procurement quantity to catch as much revenue as possible. 
Remark 4.1.1. The above result is different from that in Kouvelis and Zhao 
(2008). In their analysis for the same wholesale price w, the ordering quan-
tity in the bankruptcy region is always larger than the newsvendor solution. 
This is because in their definition of the newsvendor problem, the retailer 
purchases the products at an undiscounted price w{l + r) (following our 
notation), while he pays unit price w in our setting. 
Next we analyze how Q{w) changes with the wholesale price w. In tra-
ditional newsvendor problem, the optimal ordering quantity is decreasing in 
the wholesale price, which is very intuitive because with a higher wholesale 
price, the marginal cost of overstock is higher while the under-stock cost is 
constant. In the following, we will show that in the presence of loan raising 
and default risk, a higher wholesale price still lowers the retailer's procure-
ment quantity. In Kouvelis and Zhao (2008)'s work, they derive a similar 
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result. 
Proposition 4.1.3. Q{w) is decreasing in w. 
To prove this Proposition 4.1.3, we need some preliminary results. Define 
for any fixed |3 > 0， 
G{Q,a) ^ F{Q)-aF{aQ-P), 
where 1 > a > 0, then we can obtain the following properties. 
Lemma 4.1.4. (a) G(Q, 0) > 0 and G{Q, 1) < 0. 
(b) {G{Q,0))'a < 0, and G{Q, a) is negative unimodal function ofa. 
(c) / / G ( Q i ’ a ) = 0，then G{Q2,ct) < 0 / o r all Q2 > Qi, 
Proof. 
(a) Substituting zero and one into G[Q,a), we can easily prove that 
G(Q,0) - F(Q) > 0, and 
C(Q,1) = F(Q) - F{Q - P) < 0, 
because (3 is positive. 
(b) Taking derivative of G{Q,a) w.r.p. to a yields 
{G{Q,a))'^ = -F{aQ - /3) + af[aQ - (5)Q. 
It is easy to see that (G(Q, 0))'^ = - F ( - / 3 ) < 0. To prove G(Q, a) is a 
negative unimodal function in a, we only have to show that (G(Q, a))'^ 
crosses zero at most once, which is equivalent to show that if there exists 
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some ai satisfies (G(Q,ai)) '^ > 0，then for any a2 > cei, {G{Q,a2))a > 
0. If ( C ( Q , a i ) ) ; , > 0 , which is 
-F(aiQ - P) + a,Qf(a,Q - P) > 0 4 ^《二！ ; ) " ) > 1. 
Then for any a2 > ai , with the IFR property of F(-), it is easy to 
verify that, for Q > 0 
a2Qf{a2Q - P) > a2Qf{a1Q - P) > 1 • 
F{a2Q - P) — F{a^Q-(3)—‘ 
which implies the desired result. 
(c) To prove G{Q2, a) < 0, it is equivalent to show that F{Q2)-aF{aQ2 — 
P) < 0. Since a = F(Qi)/F(aQi - /?), we only need to prove that 
嶋 二 _ 2 - " ) ( ^ ^ - ^ ^ ) 仏 
As F(aQ2-P) is positive, it is sufficient to show that F{Q)|F{oiQ-|5) 
is decreasing in Q. Taking the first order derivative yields 
( m V _ f ^ l M z ^ f i Q ) \ / F ( ^ o m < n 
[ T ( ^ ^ ) ) =^^^^[F(aQ-P) - _ ) " ( ^ ) a 
because the demand distribution function is IFR. 
• 
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 4.1.3 
Proof. We let a = w(l + r)/p and |3 = k(l + r ) /p , it is easy to see that 
1 > OL > 0 and (5 > 0, which satisfy the condition in Lemma 4.1.4. With a 
A 
given o;, there exists a Q{a) satisfies 
GQ{a) 4 F{Q) — aF{aQ - /?) = 0, 
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while for a given Q, we also can find a{Q) satisfying 
G^ia) = F{Q) — aF(aQ - (5) = 0. 
To show Q{w) is a decreasing function of w�we only need to prove that: 
first, there is a one-to-one correspondence between Q{a) and d(Q); second, 
d(Q) is a decreasing function. 
First we prove the one-to-one correspondence. To show this, we only 
need to prove that Gg(a) , as a function of a, crosses zero only once, which 
implies that there is a unique a satisfying Gg(d) = 0. Because Gg(0) > 0, 
G g ( l ) < 0, dGQ{a)/da\^^^ < 0 and Gg(a) is negative unimodal in a, it is 
easy to verify that Gq{a) will cross zero at most once by plotting the figure 
of Gg(a) , where a G [0,1 . 
/S A 
Secondly, we prove a{Q) is a decreasing function of Q. It is equivalent 
A A A A /N A 
to show that if given Qi and Q2, where Qi < Q2, then a i (Qi ) > d2(Q2), 
where a satisfies Gq{a) 二 0. Following part (b.) in Lemma 4.1.4’ Gg^l^i) < 
Gg^(di) 二 0，which means, the curve GQ^(a) has already crossed zero, im-
plying a2(Q2) < ^i(Qi)- 口 
In the single-period problem, for the retailer, trading on credit is just like 
raising some loans. Once the wholesale price is given, his borrowing decision 
only depends on the loan rate. In other words, the retailer feels indifferent 
between raising a loan from a bank or using trade credit with the supplier. 
Mathematically, given the same wholesale price w and interest rate r, the 
retailer's optimal decisions are summarized in (4.1.4) and (4.1.5). However, 
from the supplier's point of view, if the retailer deals with the supplier on 
credit, the supplier bears the retailer's default risk because of the demand 
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uncertainty. Therefore, the supplier may need to adjust her pricing strategy 
to take this risk into account, which in turn will affect the retailer's ordering 
quantity. We will focus on the problems of the supplier in the next chapter. 
In the following part of this chapter, we will analyze the two-period prob-
lem from the perspective of the retailer under different settings. It shall be 
seen that although in the thesis we focus on the two-period model, similar 
results can be obtained for the general multi-period case. 
4.2 The Basic Setting 
This section concerns the model introduced in Section §3.1.1. We consider 
the periodic-review problem with two planning periods. To better illustrate, 
the first period is numbered 1 and the second period is 2. The only connection 
between these two periods is the cash carry-over. In our model, we focus on 
the lost-sale setting and assume the lead time is zero. In the basic setting, 
our model is similar to Chao et al. (2008)'s work except that we do not 
consider inventory carry over between the two consecutive periods. In the 
later sections, our setting is different from theirs in that we take financing 
issues into account, such as external financing and bankruptcy risk. 
Let ki be the capital level and Qi be the procurement decisions at the 
beginning of period i, respectively, where i = 1,2, and k3 be the terminal 
wealth at the end of the planning horizon. Because the retailer is capital 
constrained and self-financed, the procurement decision satisfies the cash 
flow constraint 
0 < Qi < ki/w, i = 1,2. (4.2.1) 
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and the revenue from sales in period i is pmin{Qi, Di}. Hence the total 
capital level at the end of period i, which is also the capital level at the 
beginning of period i + 1, is 
ki+i = pmin{Qj, Di} - wQi + ki. (4.2.2) 
Therefore, the retailer's problem is to decide an ordering quantity to max-
imize the expected terminal wealth at the end of the second period, given 
initial capital level ki, subject to the cash flow constraint in each period. 
That is, the retailer's decision problem is 
max E [ y , (4.2.3) 
Q1,Q2 J ^ � 
subject to (4.2.1) and (4.2.2). 
Next we analyze this problem using backward induction. In the second pe-
riod which is also the last period, the ending wealth is fc3 = pmin{Q2, ^2}— 
wQ2 + k2. Denote by V2{k2) the maximum expected ending wealth given 
that the initial capital level at the beginning of period two is A ,^ then the 
retailer's optimization problem is 
V2[k2) = max n2(A;2,O2), (4.2.4) 
0<wQ2<k2 
where 
ri2(A:2,Q2) = ED2[pmin{Q2,D2} - wQ2 + k2 . 
This problem is essentially the single period problem we studied in the 
previous section. Therefore, the optimal ordering quantity in the second 
period, Q\ is determined as 
Q5 = m i n | g o , ^ | , (4.2.5) 
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where Qo = F_ i ( ^ ^ ) ' 
Now let's go backwards to the first period. The initial state of the second 
period is the ending wealth of this period. Similarly, we denote Vi(A:i) as 
the maximum expected revenue given the initial cash level is k：, then the 
optimization problem is 
Vi(ki) = max n i (Q i ) , (4.2.6) 
wQi<ki • 
with 
n i ( Q i ) = En：V2 (ki - wQi + pmin{Qi , D i } ) . 
The trade-off in the optimization problem above is between ordering prod-
ucts and saving cash for the future. When products are ordered, the retailer 
is exposed to the risk of not selling them and as a result, loses the oppor-
tunity of saving the cash for the next period. Intuitively, the more cash on 
hand, the more expected revenue the retailer can get, since the higher initial 
cash level, the larger chance for him to order up to the optimal base-stock 
level. According to Chao et al. (2008), I l i (Qi) is a concave function in 
Qi, therefore, the optimal ordering quantity is determined by the first order 
condition. The following propositions characterize some properties of the 
optimal ordering quantity. 
Proposition 4.2.1. Q； < Qo. 
Proof. To show the proposition is true, we only need to show the un-
constrained optimal ordering quantity in the first period, we denote as Q"*, 
is less than or equal to the newsvendor fractile Qo, since the optimal solu-
tion should be the minimum between the quantity that makes the constraint 
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binding and QY. Notice that for a given w, the unconstrained single period 
objective function for the retailer is 
U-(Qi) = EDMQuDi), 
where g{Qi,Di) = [pmm{Qi,Di}] - wQi + ki. 
Then we can rewrite IIi(Qi) as ^DiV2{9{Qi^Di)). To show Q^* < Qo, we 
only need to show that 
if ED,dg{Qi,D,) /dQ, = 0, 
then E& f ^ ' ( y t o i , A ) ) ^ % ^ ) < 0 . 
\ oQi / 
It is not hard to prove that V2(^(Qh^1)) is decreasing in Di, since V2(.) is 
a concave function and g {Qi ,Di ) is increasing in the second dimension. We 
also can show that 
dg(QuDi)——切’ if Di < Qi； 
Q^^ 
p — w, otherwise, 
\ 
which indicates that dg(Qi,Di)/dQi is increasing in Di. According to the 
Rearrangement Inequality (Theorem 11.1 in Ross (2000)), when EDidg{Qi,Di) /dQi = 
0, we have 
E D i ( V ^ ( " W i , A ) ) ^ ^ ) < E M Q . M ) - E j - ^ ^ 
= 0 ， 
which finishes our proof. • 
Intuitively, if the retailer has more than enough cash, he will order as • 
many as the newsvender solution since in this case our problem becomes two 
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separable newsvendor problems. In contrast, if the retailer’ cash level is very 
low and the financial constraint is binding, then it is impossible for him to 
order Qo. Another case is that the retailer has enough cash on hand, but not 
that much to cover the procurement in the second period, then he had better 
save some capital for future use and order a smaller quantity comparing to 
the newsvendor solution. 
Similar to the traditional single period newsvendor problem, the order . 
quantity decreases in the wholesale price in a two-period problem: 
Proposition 4.2.2. Ql{w) decreases in w. 
Proof. To show the monotonicity of Q\, we only need to show that 
rii(it;, Qi) is submodular. We can write the full expression of IIi(w;,Qi) as 
n/ 门、 c / c � • f . f^i-^^Qi+pmin{Qi,Di} ^ ^ 
ni(w;,Qi) = En, < p Ez?2 mm j min | - , Q 0 | , ^ 2 > 
- m i n 1^：! — wQi + p min{Qi, Di}, wQo | 
. +A;i - wQi + p min{Qi, Di} |. 
Then it is easy to verify that for any given Di and D2, d^Ili{w, Qi)/dwdQi 
is non-positive. • 
4.3 The Bank Loan Setting 
This section concerns the model introduced in Section §3.1.2. Different from 
the basic setting, we now have an additional variable B, which is the debt 
the retailer borrows in the first period. We need to track this information 
because although the financing decision is only made in the first period, the 
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repayment is due at the end of the decision horizon. Figure 4.3 illustrates 
the cash flow in this setting. 
p m i n { Q i , D i } p m i n { O 2 , ^ } 
k 4 I 
牛 B 
A 
h h \ • 
t 
I I • 
wQi v0Q2 B ( l + r2) 
> — — , — — M — — , — — ‘ 
The Pt period The 2"^ period 
Figure 4.3: Cash Flow - Two-Period Bank Loan Setting 
Similar to the basic setting, if we denote h as the capital level, Qi be 
the procurement decision at the beginning of period i respectively, where 
i = 1,2，then in this case 
h = p m i n { Q i , D i } - wQi + h + B, (4.3.1) 
then the retailer's optimality equation in the second period is 
y2{k2,B) = max n',(k2,B,Q2), (4.3.2) 
0<wQ2<k2 
where 
n ^ 2 , B,Q2) = Ez^(pmin{Q2, D2} — wQ2 + h 一 (1 + r2)B) + . 
Proposition 4.3.1. IfD2 has an increasing failure rate, then n^(A:2,j5,Q2) • 
is unimodal in (^2. 
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Proof. By taking derivative, we have 
dnl{k2.B,Q2)〜石…“ wF{Dsm)\ 
^ ^ ^ ^ = 傳 ) 、 1 _ 趣 ） ) ’ 
where Ds{Q2) = {wQ2 一 k2 + (1 + r)B)/p. To prove the unimodality, we 
only need to prove that the second term in the brackets is increasing in Q2. 
Taking derivative to this term, yields 
( wF[D,{Q,))\ , = wF{Ds{Q2)) ( i m 一 wfiDM2))\ • 
V p m 2 ) ； 丨 � ^ J - v n Q 2 ) U w 2 ) W m M ) • 
It is easy to show that under the optimal condition, Q2 must be greater than 
or equal to Ds{Q2), then with the assumption of IFR, the equation above is 
always greater than zero, which proves our result. • 
According to the proposition above, the optimal solution can be fully 
characterized by: 
Q2 = m i n | ^ ( A : 2 , B ) , ^ | , (4.3.3) 
where Q2(k2, B) satisfies 
_ = . 户 ( " “ + ( 1 叫 . (4.3.4) 
V p / 
This result is similar to that in the capital constrained newsvender problem, 
where the optimal ordering quantity is the minimum of a newsvendor fractile 
and the maximum amount the retailer can order using the on hand cash. 
The difference is mainly resulted from the financing issues. Because of the 
capital constraints, the retailer would seek additional financing in the first 
period, and he has to take bankruptcy issues into account. The following 
propositions identify some properties of the optimal order quantity. 
39 
Chapter 4 Retailer's Perspective 
Proposition 4.3.2. Q2{k, B) is increasing in B. 
Proof. By implicit function theorem, we have 
dQl{k.B) = / l + r / (0 (B))X / ( / ^ ^ | ( ^ ^ _ _ H / ( ^ ^ ) 
9B “ V V n<i>m) ' \F{Q\(k,B)) ~ pTWW) j ‘ 
where_ = " ^ - W l + ^ . 
P 
Since we assume the demand distribution function is IFR, and the nu-
merator is always non-negative, this partial derivative is greater than zero if 
A,, 
and only if Q ^ k , B ) > ¢ (8 ) . We will show this condition must be satisfied 
by contradiction. If it is not, i.e., wQl — k + (1 + r2)B > j)Q\, which means 
even if all the retailer's products are sold out, the profit is not sufficient to 
pay off the debt. In another word, the retailer will bankrupt unavoidably. 
In this case, it is profitable for the retailer to order more because for some 
Q2 which is greater than Q\ and satisfies wQl - k + (1 + r2)B < pQ^, there 
exists some chance that the retailer will make some profit, which makes 
n^2(A:,5,g^)>n^(/c,B,Q^)=:O. 
This contradicts with the optimality of Q t so it must be true that Q2(k, B) > 
HB). • 
If the capital constrained retailer has a higher debt level, he should order 
more. This is intuitive because the retailer with a higher debt level will be 
more aggressive to capture as much revenue as he can to pay off the debt 
and avoid bankruptcy. 
Next we go backwards to the first period's problem. Similarly, we denote . 
y ^ ^ i ) 朋 the maximum expected revenue given the initial cash level is ki, 
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then the maximization problem is 
max nJ (B ,g i ) , 
0<wQi<ki+B l\ … ” 
with 
Yl\{B,Q,) = ED,V2{h + B-wQ,+pmm{Q,,D,),B). 
The trade-off in the optimal problem above is as follows: On one hand, if 
the retailer borrows more, he has more capital on hand and a bigger chance 
to order to the optimal ordering level, however, he runs a higher risk of bank-
ruptcy; on the other hand, similar to the basic setting, the more products 
are ordered, the higher the overstock risk the retailer is exposed to and he 
loses the opportunity of saving cash for the future. Note that for the single 
period bank loan setting, the retailer always uses up the capital on hand, or 
borrows just enough to cover the procurement. However, in the two-period 
case, the retailer may save some cash for the next period as he does not have 
the opportunity to borrow money in the second period. 
With additional assumption on the demand distribution, we can show 
the objective function of the retailer at the first period is log-concave. It is 
intuitive that log-concavity implies unimodality. 
Proposition 4.3.3. Ifthe demand density function /(•) is log-concave, then 
nJ(5, Qi) is jointly log-concave in Qi and B. 
To show this, we need a lemma: 
Lemma 4.3.4. If / (x , y) is log-concave, x G R � t h e n E^>/(x,i^) is log-
concave in X，if the pdf of D is log-concave. 
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Proof. By the definition of log-concavity, we only need to show for any 
x1,x2, 
Ez,/(x1,D)Ez,/(x2,D) < (Eof(^^^^,D))， 
V 2 / 
which is equivalent to 
l / ( x i , O 0 W ^ l / ( X 2 , W W f / f S ( l / ( ^ ^ i ^ , O 0 ( t ) ^ ) . (4.3.5) 
Consider three functions: 
9i{t) = /(xi,_); 
92{t) = / (x2 , i )0W; 
9^{t) = / ( ^ ^ 4 ^ , t ) 0 W , 
then for any t1,t2, 
f h ± h y ^ , , x 1 + x 2 “ + t 2 u , t i + , 2 � V 
' ' [ - ^ ) = � A ~ T ~ ， T ) ^ ~ T ~ ” 
> / ( X l , , l ) 0 ( , l ) / ( X 2 , , 2 _ 2 ) 
=^1(^1)^2(^2)-
Now applying Prekopa-Leindler's inequality (see the remark after this proof), 
j^9i{t)dtJ^g^{t)dt< (^j^93{t)d?!， 
which is exactly (4.3.5). • 
Now we apply the lemma to show the proposition. We have denoted 
A; + B — wQi + pmin{Qi ,Di } as A:2(^1,Q1), we only need to show that 
V2{k2(D1,Q1),B) is jointly log-concave in 5 , Q i and Di. This is not hard 
to prove because V{{k, B) is jointly log-concave and increasing in the first • 
dimension, while k2(D1,Q1,B) is jointly concave. 
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Remark 4.3.1. (Prekopa-Leindler's Inequality) Let 0 < A < 1 and let f,g,h : 
lR" — [0，+oo) be non-negative real-valued measurable functions defined on 
n-dimensional Euclidean space M". Suppose that these functions satisfy 
h{{l-X)x^Xy)>f{xy-'g{y)\ 
for all X and y in E". Then 
||"||i = / h{x) dx > ( [ f(x)dx)"(f ^Wdo:y = ||/||J-^ ||p||t. 
JR^ VjK" / \Jm / 
As we stated before, this result can also be extended to the multi-period 
situation. With this unimodality property, the optimal ordering quantity 
in each period can be fully characterized by the first order condition and it 
guarantees that we can find the optimal solutions quickly. 
4.4 The Trade Credit Setting 
This section concerns the model introduced in Section §3.1.3. For. the trade 
credit scheme, we consider the early payment discount model. This is equiv-
alent to model it as a bank financing setting except the debt holder is the 
supplier. Figure 4.4 illustrates the cash flow in this setting. In the beginning 
of each period, the retailer decides how much to borrow from the supplier (if 
necessary) and his ordering quantity. Note that we assume the retailer will 
repay all the debt only at the end of the planning horizon. If unfortunately, 
the retailer is unable to pay off the unpaid cost plus the interests, he will 
be forced into bankruptcy and his debt holder, which is the supplier here, 
will take all the residual value and suffer from the bankruptcy cost, if any. 
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The ist period The 2"^ period 
Figure 4.4: Cash Flow - Two-Period Trade Credit Setting 
Therefore, in this case, the supplier will be the one who shares default risk 
with the retailer. 
Next we analyze this problem from the second period. We denote V2{k2, Bi) 
as the retailer's expect profit in the second period given the borrowing 
amount in the first period is Bi and the on hand capital level at the be-
ginning of the second period is k2. Then the optimization problem can be 
formulated as the following: 
^ ( ^ 2 , ^ i ) = 门 max n^(A:2,B1,Q2,B2), (4.4.1) 
V2>O,B2>O 
S.t. 0 < wQ2 < k2 + ^2, 
^ 2 > 0 , 
with 
Ul(k2,BuQ2,B2) = ED“pmin{Q2，D2}—w;Q2+A^-(l+n)Bi — (l+r2)B2) + . 
In (4.4.1), obviously there is no incentive for him to borrow more than 
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he need, that is, B2 = {wQ2 — ^：2)+，because the retailer has financing op-
portunity in each period and we ignore the time value of money. Similar 
to the bank loan case, it is easy to show that U2(k2,B1,Q2, B2) is a jointly 
unimodal function, thus, the optimal ordering quantity in the trade credit 
setting, Qf can be fully characterized by the first order condition. The 
following expression indicates the optimized decision of the retailer: 
Qi* = ( 4 . 4 . 2 ) . 
fQt i f i ^ 2 - i r ^ ^ ) 4 
V p / w 




where Q^ satisfies p F M ) = —1 + r)F, ( W ^ 2 - ^ ) ( l + r2) + n ^ A 
V p y 
In the first case of (4.4.2), the retailer has more than enough cash for 
their operations and will not borrow in the second period. While in the 
second case of (4.4.2), the retailer's capital level is not sufficient but is also 
not too low and the interest rate in this period is relatively high, then he 
will use all the cash he has to finance his procurement and will not borrow. 
Finally, in the third case, if the initial cash of the retailer is very low or 
the interest rate is sufficiently low, after exhausting his equity, the retailer 
would seek additional financing from the supplier to order (¾. Note that 
in the formulation (4.4.1), the state variable k2 is a function of the realized 
demand, the ordering quantity and the debt level in the first period, that is 
k2(ku Bi,QuDi) = pmin{Q^,Di} — wQi + Bi + h. (4.4.3) 
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Therefore, the problem of the first period is 
m^c n 5 ( B i , g i ) , (4.4.4) 
W i , ^ i 
s.t. 0 < wQi < ki + B i , 
Bi > 0， (4.4.5) 
where 
n'i{Bi，Qi) = En,V2{ki + Bi — wQi + pmin{Qi，Di}’ Bi). 
Similar to the bank loan case, we can derive the following result. 
Proposition 4.4.1. Ifthe demand density function /(•) is log-concave, then 
U{(Bi,Qi) is jointly log-concave in Qi and B[ 
To prove this proposition, we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.4.2. If V{x,y) is jointly log-concave and increasing in the first 
dimension, f(x,y) isjointly concave, then V{f{x,y),y) isjointly log-concave. 
Proof. Following the property of the concave function, we have 
V(/(Xi’yi),"i).V(/(X2，y2)，y2) < 〒 X i ’ y i ) : / ( X 2 ， y 2 ) ， ^ ) 2 
V 2 2 J 
< V ff (xi + X2 m + y2\ m±^Y 
一 V V 2 ， 2 J ’ 2 J ， 
where the second inequality follows from the increasing property of \^(.). • 
According to the above result, V2{k2,B1) is jointly log-concave, and in-
creasing in the first dimension. We also know that k2 (ki，Bi，Qi ’ Di ) is jointly 
concave, then it is easy to see that V2{k2(k1,B1,Q1,D1),B1) is jointly l o g - . 
concave. Apply Lemma 4.3.4’ we can prove the proposition. 
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4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we first study the model under a single-period setting and 
characterize the optimal operational and financial decisions which provide 
some managerial insights on how to manage products and financial flows 
simultaneously. We find that the optimal ordering quantity may not be 
monotone in the retailer's initial budget. 
We then extend this problem into a two-period dynamic setting. Under 
some mild assumptions on the demand distribution, we show the unirnodality 
of the retailer's objective function, which is very important for finding the 




In this chapter, we analyze the problem from the supplier's perspective. In 
§5.1, we present the theoretical results of the supplier's problem in a simpli-
fied single-period model. After that, in §5.2, we extend our problem to the 
two-period setting. 
5.1 Single Period Results 
Following the retailer's best strategy in the single-period basic setting, we 
next investigate how financial constraint of the retailer affects the supplier. 
Intuitively, the supplier's revenue is influenced by the insufficient initial cash 
of the retailer due to the ordering decrement. In our model, the supplier 
needs to decide a wholesale price contract to optimize his own profit. Note 
that in our model, we assume the supplier does not face financial constraints. 
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5.1.1 The Basic Setting 
In the basic setting, the supplier's problem is essentially the same as "selling 
to the newsvendor" problem, the only difference is that for any given whole-
sale price, the retailer's optimal response decision is constrained by his initial 
cash. Then it is easy to derive the supplier's optimization problem, which is 
max Us{w) = (w-c)Q*{w), (5.1.1) 
where Q*{w) denotes the optimal ordering quantity identified in equation 
(4.1.2). The supplier should never set the wholesale price w lower than the 
production cost c or higher than the selling price p, because if so, either the 
supplier or the retailer has no incentive to sell the product. 
Lemma 5.1.1. There are at most two values ofw satisfying F~^ (-~~—^ = 
^ ^ P ^ 
w. 
Proo f . To prove this lemma, we only need to show wF~^({p - w)/p) 
is first strictly increasing in w then decreasing in w after some point, i.e., a 
strictly unimodal function. Because there is a one-to-one mapping from w to 
Qo{w), where w = pF(Qo), we only need to show that pF(Qo)Qo is a strictly 
unimodal function of Qo. By taking the derivative w.r.p. to Qo, we have 
pF(Qo)( l - Qof{Qo)/F(Qo)). Because pF{Qo) is nonnegative, it is easy to 
see that when demand distribution is IFR, 1 - Qof{Qo)/F{Qo) is decreasing 
as Qo > 0. Therefore, pF(Qo)Qo first increases with Qo then decreases and 
the result follows. • 
49 
Chapter 5 Supplier's Perspective 
According the retailer's ordering quantity, we analyze the supplier's prob-
lem as follows. First we define wi < w2 such that 
广 1 (〒） = !， . . 1 , 2 . (5.1.2) 
V P J Wi 
Note that W1,W2 may be equal. If there is no solution of the above equation, 
then let Wi = W2 = —00. 
Proposition 5.1.2. (Caldentey and Chen, 2008) (a) Us{w) is unimodal; 
(b) the optimal wholesale price w* = max{it*o,w^2}, where Wo satisfies 
Qo{wo) = ^ " ~ ^ ^ (5.1.3) 
P f{Qo(wo)) ) 
Proof. To prove (a), we analyze two cases. The first case is that the 
J^ (rt^ \iU \^ 
retailer is never constrained by his capital, i.e., — > F~^ ^ L Z - for all 
^ V V / 
w. It then follows that w2 = - 0 0 . Note that F{Qo) = {p - w)/p. Since 
F(-) is strictly increasing and continuous, there exists a one-to-one mapping 
between w and Qo- Let w{Qo) be the unique wholesale price which induces 
the retailer to purchase Qo units, then we have w{Qo) = F{Qo)p. We can 
rewrite the supplier's profit function as follows: 
n“Qo，—Qo)) = {w{Qo) - c)Qo. 
Taking the first derivative with respect to Qo, 
{^s{w{Qo)^Qo))' = w{Qo)-c + Qow'(Qo) 
=pF(Qo) (1 一 q J S ^ — —c ^ 
^ ^V ^ V ( Q o ) pF(Qo)；-
We know c / { p F { Q o ) ) is increasing, so as long as the demand distribution . 
is IFR, Qof{Qo)/F{Qo) is increasing, then the supplier's profit is unimodal. 
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Secondly, if there exist a finite w� , then the supplier's objective function 
becomes U^(?/;) = {w - c) mm{Qo{w),k/w}. Note that (w - c)k/w is an 
increasing concave function in w. By the definition of unimodality, it is not 
hard to show the minimum of two unimodal functions is still unimodal. Thus, 
part (a) is proved. 
For (b), we also need to consider two separate cases. Note that if w > w2 
or w < wi, then k/w > Qo(w). And it is not hard to see that wi < wo as . 
the left-sided derivative of Ug(w) at w = wi is greater than or equal to 0. 
Specifically, for a small e > 0, 
(^;i - c)Qo(iui) - (wi — e - c)Qo(wi - ¢ ) � 
€ -
(u>i - c)k/wi - (it;i - 6 一 c)k/{wi - ¢) 
- > 0， 
because of the definition of Wi such that for w < wi, Qo(w) < k/w. Thus, 
(i) if wo > W2, clearly ^(it;) is increasing in w < wo and decreasing in 
w > wo so Wo is optimal. 
(ii) If W2 > wo, then as Us(w) is increasing in w < W2 and decreasing in 
w > W2, the optimal whole sale price w* = w2. 
Therefore, w* = max{u/o,w;2}- • 
Figure 5.1 shows the supplier's profit function in the basic setting. 
The above result implies that when the retailer is financial constrained, 
the supplier tends to set a higher wholesale price than in the case the re-
tailer has sufficient cash. From the supply chain coordination point of view, 
a higher wholesale price intensifies the double marginalization effect and re-
duces the supply chain efficiency. 
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^ — » > w 
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Figure 5.1: Single Period Supplier's Profit Function in Basic Setting 
Special Case - Uniformly Distributed Demand 
If the market demand is uniformly distributed between [0,1], then the 
retailer's optimal ordering quantity Q, and the supplier's optimal wholesale 
price w can be determined as follows. 
(i) I fp<4A: , 
^*/ N P - W * P^ - (? 
Q H — ，w； 二 L _ • 
p 4p 
(ii) If p > 4k, 
z 
p — w , 
, if w < wi or w > wo： 
Q*(w) = , P 一 — 
k 一， otherwise, . w ‘ 
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( 宁 ， i f ^ > ^ ； 
w* = 2 4p 
W2, otherwise, 
\ 
, V - vV —4pk p + vV - 4pk where wi = — , wo = - — — — — . 
2 ‘ 2 
5.1.2 The Bank Loan Setting 
Next we consider the case where the retailer finances his operations by raising 
external loan from a bank with an interest rate r. 
Given the retailer's best response to the wholesale price in Lemma 4.1.1, 
we now consider the supplier's problem. Note that the debt holder in this 
setting is the bank, therefore, when the retailer issues a loan, the supplier 
does not share any risk and the profit function for the supplier is the sarne 
as that in the basic setting, except that Q*(w) is substituted by Ql(w). 
max n^(u;) = {w — c)Ql{w). (5.1.4) 
When the supplier decides the wholesale price, she needs to consider 
the corresponding response of the retailer. In the first case of (4.1.4), i.e., 
F—i(l — w/p) < k/w, then the optimal ordering quantity is the same as that 
in traditional newsvendor problem, it has been proved that profit function 
of the supplier is unimodal. On the other hand, if the internal fund of the 
retailer is insufficient and it is not profitable for him to seek additional funds, 
the profit function of the supplier is an increasing function of the wholesale 
price. Next we will examine the last situation, where the retailer's capital 
level is insufficient and the interest rate is low enough so that he will raise 
some loan. 
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Proposition 5.1.3. Ifthe demand distribution function F{-) is CIFR (con-
vex increasing failure rate), then the profit function of the supplier n^(i(;) is 
unimodal in the range 
^ / k __i fl-w{l^r)W w e < w ： — < F ^ } • 
1 ^ V p J) 
Proof. When the retailer raises a fund, the optimal ordering quantity 
is Q{w), determined in (4.1.4). Taking the first derivative of Ul{w) with 
respect to w yields 
^ - ( . - c ) % l . O H . 
Since Q{w) satisfies pF{Q{w)) = w(l + r)F ( M H - ^ ) ( l + 0^ ’ ^y the 
V P / 
implicit function theorem, the derivative of Q{w) can be expressed as follows 
dQ{w) _ I pF{5{w))-w{l + r)f{6(w))Q(w) 
— — ^ u,Hl^rYf{SH)-p'f{Q{w))， 
where we denote {wQ(w) — k){l + r)/p as <5(w;) for notational convenience. 
By substituting dQ(w)/dw into dU^^{w)/dw, we can easily get 
卿 切 ) = ( ! - C Q^ffiQW) cmw))\\ 
— V ^ U(QH) pF{S{w))J 
/ ( — 1 + r) f[5(w)) _ f{Q{w))\ 
/ V P F((^H) “ F(Q(w))^ . 
To proof the unimodality of U^,(w), we only need to show the first derivative 
of supplier's profit function changes sign at most once. It is easy to verify 
that if the demand distribution function is IFR, then the denominator will 
be always less than zero because (^ (w;) < Q(w) and w{l^r)/p < 1. To prove 
the proposition, we only need to prove that the numerator is an increasing . 
function of w. 
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Because {w - c)/w is increasing and Q(w) is decreasing in w, if we can 
show the latter term in the first bracket is decreasing (since it is positive as 
F{-) is IFR), that is, 
. ( , , ) A fiQM) cf{SH) . . . . 
( ( ) P ^ M ) {pF(sH)) (5.1.5) 
is decreasing, then this proposition is proved. Taking the first order derivative 
of ((w) w.r.p to w, yields • 
^ T = _ - ) ) • ) - ^ ^ _ ) ) H'W + QH)， 
where h{-) denotes failure rate, i.e., h{-) = f{-)/F{-). With the assumption 
that demand distribution function is IFR, the first term in the expression 
is always less than or equal to zero. To prove ({w) is decreasing, we will 
analyze in the following two cases: 
(i) If wQ'(w) + Q{w) > 0，the second term is positive, then we can easily 
see that the first derivative of ({w) is negative. 
(ii) If wQ'(w) + Q{w) < 0’ it is easy to verify that 
Q'{w)l > lc{l + r)wQ'{w)/p^ 
> |c ( l+r ) ( 7 ^ Q > ) + Q H ) /p2 
as Q{w) > 0. Therefore as long as h'{6{w)) < h'{Q{w)), the first 
order derivative of ({w) is still negative. Because CIFR implies that 
h'(S{w)) < h'(Q{w)), ifthe demand distribution function satisfies CIFR, 
the proposition is proved. • 
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On the other hand, if the retailer does not raise any fund, then we can 
easily find that the corresponding profit function of the supplier is also uni-
modal. 
Next we will examine the overall supplier's profit function and identify 
the optimal wholesale price. Similar to the previous subsection, we can show 
that there are at most two w satisfies the equation 
F-i fP-w(l + r)\ = _fc 
V P ) w. 
We denote the two solutions as w2, and W4 with W3 < w4. If there is no 
solution, then we define w3 = w4 = -00. For any given w, wF~^{l — w/p) 
is strictly greater than wF_i(l - w(l + r)/p), therefore, we have W4 < w2. 
Figure 5.2 shows the supplier's profit function in this setting and the 
following theory determines the optimal decision for the supplier. 
/.n, 
z ^ ^ ^ ? ^ ^ ^ — 
, , " ^ ^ , f i i i \ i \ Unconstrained 
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Figure 5.2: Single Period Supplier's Profit Function in Bank Loan Setting . 
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Theorem 5.1.4. (a) Ifw4 = —00，then the supplier's profitfunction n '^(w;) 
is unimodal; otherwise, ifw4 > -00, ni(w) has at most two modes. 
(b) The supplier's optimal wholesale price, wl, is determined as follows, 
(i) Ifw2 = -00, the optimal wholesale price w^ = WQ. 
� U u)4 = -00, but W2 > -00, then the optimal wholesale price 
wl = W2. . 
(iii) Ifw4 > -00, then 
* ifwQ e [w1,w2], the optimal wholesale price, wl, will be either 
W2 or w; 
* 和0 该[wi,W2], the optimal wholesale price, wl, will be either 
Wo or w, where w is defined as 
^ = max{w; G [w3,w4] : (w - c){Q(w))'^Q(w) > 0|5.1.6) 
Proof . According to the retailer's optimal ordering quantity with differ-
ent w, the profit function of the supplier can be characterized as follows. 
(1.) When w G [c,w;3j, n^(if;) is increasing. If w3 > -00, we know W2 > 
m > wi. We know wo > wi, hence Us{w) is increasing in [c,wi). 
Moreover, as w^ < w2, Us{w) is increasing in [wi, ^；3] as well. 
(2.) When w e (w3,w4), nJ(iu) is unimodal, which has been shown in 
Proposition 5. 
(3.) When w € (^ ^4,^ ^2), ^^sM is increasing as n^(it;) = {w - c)k/w in this 
range. 
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(4.) When w G {w2,p), n^(t(;) is unimodal. This can be argued as follows. 
If WQ > W2, then U.l(w) first increase until wo and then decreases. If 
Wo < W2, n^(u;) is decreasing in w for w > w2. 
Because n^(i^) is continues, U^{w) is at most a Bi-modal function with modes 
at w and Wo or w and W2. If there exist no w^ , or W4, then Ul(w) is a unimodal 
function. 
In the first two cases, the supplier's optimization problem is the same as 
the previous section. In the last one, the supplier's profit function is Bi-modal 
and the optimal solution is either arg m&x^^{{w - c)Q{w)} or argmax^{(iu -
c) mm{Qo(w),k/w}}. • 
Since the supplier's profit function has at most two peaks, depending 
on the tightness of financial constraints, the optimal wholesale price will be 
either the solution in the basic setting or the optimal one when the retailer 
raises some loans. This theorem is very important since it makes the search 
procedure of the optimal solution much more efficient than an exhaustive 
search. Specifically, to find the optimal wholesale price, we first make sure 
the shape of the supplier's profit curve. If it has two modes, which is the more 
complex case, we only have to solve Equation 5.1.2 and 5.1.6 by Bisection 
method for w2 and w, and then substitute these two values to the supplier's 
function. The one achieves a higher value will be the optimal solution. 
From above analysis, we can see if the supplier offers a sufficiently high 
or low wholesale price, the retailer does not borrow because in either of 
these two cases, the internal capital level of the retailer is relatively high and 
therefore, the financial constraint becomes redundant. On the other hand, if 
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the supplier sets a wholesale price in the middle range, and the interest rate 
is relatively low, then the retailer will seek for external financing and there 
will exist a unique optimal wholesale price for the supplier. The supplier 
compares the profits under these two optimal wholesale prices and chooses 
the one leads to a higher profit. 
This result implicates that the tightness of the retailer's financial con-
straint will also affect the wholesale price provided by the supplier and the . 
external financing option may somehow improve the supply chain perfor-
mance’ which we will present in our numerically analysis later. 
Special Case - Uniformly Distributed Demand 
If the demand distribution is uniform on [0,1], then we can characterize 
the optimal wholesale price in a sharper form. 
(i) If4A:(l + r )> j9>4A: , 
Ql{w) = Q%w),wl = w*. • 
(ii) I fp>4A: ( l + r), 
V - w 
~-~’ 11 w < wi or w > W2] 
^bi^^ = < ^ , if Wi < w < W3 or W4 < W < W2; 
Q, otherwise, 
\ 
where Q 二 P ' - w ( l + r ) p - w k ( l ^ 
p^-w^l + ry ， 
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P- vV_4pA;(l + r) , p+ Wp^-4pk(l+r) 
^ = ^ "^20T75~~~and^ = __5(1775~~. 
a r g m a x { n j ( u ; ) , n ^ ( ^ ) } , i f A : > ^ f ^ ; 
w； = 2 4p 
arg max{n^(i<)),n^(w;2)}, otherwise, 
\ 
P (p2 + (c + k)p(l + r) - ^k(l + r)(p2 c2(l + r)2)(2p + fc(l + r))� 
where iD = L 
(1 + r) (p2 + cp{l + r) + ck{l + r)2) • 
Proposition 5.1.5. If the demand distribution is Uniform on [0,lj, in the 
case where the retailer raises an extemal fund from a bank, if 
(i) p2 pk{l + r) c(l + r)y/p(p — 4k) < 0, or 
(ii) c satisfies 
- c ' ( l + r)2 (p2 + 2kp{(r — 1) + k\l + r f ) 
+2cp(l + r)(p - k(l + r))vV(P - 4k) — p' + 4kp^(l + r) > 0, 
then wl = W2； otherwise, wl = w. 
5.1.3 The Trade Credit Setting 
In this subsection, we discuss the supplier's problem in the trade credit set-
ting. First, we assume that if the retailer has insufficient cash to pay for the 
procurement cost, he has to give the supplier all the internal cash on hand 
as a deposit and pay off the rest after demand realization. At the end of 
the period, if the realized revenue is more than enough to cover the unpaid 
part, the retailer pays it off and receives the residual profit. In this case, the . 
supplier receives full payment plus interests. However, if unfortunately, the 
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revenue is insufficient to pay off the debt, the retailer goes to bankruptcy 
and the supplier only acquires the residual value of the firm. Therefore, the 
supplier's payoff function in trade credit case can be written as the following. 
y 
{w - c)Ql{w), if F—i ( " ( l + d ) < A; 
V P / W, 
m ， U l { w ) = (wQl{w) + rB-(^ ;))F(^ *^ ")(^ +^ )) (5.1.7) 
+ fB*H(i^r)/p^^^ + 1^)卿工—cQ*(u;)^ o t h e r w i s e . ‘ 
V 
The first case of (5.1.7) indicates the expected profit of the supplier when 
the retailer，initial cash is sufficient to pay the procurement cost in full so that 
the supplier does not need to extend trade credit to the retailer. While in 
the second case, the retailer trades with the supplier on credit and therefore, 
he is exposed to the bankruptcy risk. The supplier, who is the debt holder, 
may also bear some loss. We can easily verify that if the retailer does not 
borrow from the supplier, the optimal action for the supplier is the same 
as that in the basic setting. As a result, to fully characterize the optimal 
decision of the supplier, we need to know some properties of the supplier's 
objective function in the second ca^e. Toward this end, we first need the 
following result. 
Lemma 5.1.6. Ifthere exists some w satisfies (w : l-Q(w)j^ S^^^ = o\ 
. 八 ^ HQH) 了， 
then w{Q{w)Y + Q{w) > 0 if and only ifw < w. 
Proof. We substitute the expression of Q'(w) into wQ'(w) + Q(w), then 
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we have 
.g'W + QH = —1 + 例^))-切2(1 + 啊 ( _ ) ) 々 ( 咖 
w'(l^ryf{S{w))/p-pf{Q{w)) 十^叫 
(i — d M , _ ) p ) 
= (丄 ^y^)F{6{w)) w{l+r)) 
—(^^(l+r) f{5(w)) p f{Q{w))\ 
V p F{5{w)) u ; ( l + r ) F{6{w)) J 
( 1 - 加 ) 纖 ） 
/ ^ ; ( l + r ) f{S{w)) — f{Q{w)) \ • 
V P F(<5(uO) F{Q{w))� 
Recall that 5{w) = (wQ(w) - k)(l + r)/p. 
We assume that the demand distribution function is IFR, then the de-
nominator is always less than zero. Therefore, wQ'{w)^Q{w) is greater than 
zero if and only if the numerator is less than zero, that is, 
1 一 加 ) 幽 < 0 . 
nQW)— 
We have proved that Q(w) is a decreasing function, and IFR implies IGFR 
(increasing generalized failure rate), that is, xf{x)/F{x) is an increasing 
function if x is nonnegative. As a result, Q{w)f(Q{w))/F{Q{w)) is a de-
creasing function of w. Then it is easy to verify that as long as w is smaller 
than some specific w which satisfies 
i - g n M w i . o , 
nQH) 
八f /s 
wQ (w) + Q{w) is greater than zero. 口 
By using the above lemma, we can obtain the following result. 
Proposition 5.1.7. If the retailer finances his ordering using trade credit, 
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—is> w e {w : k/w < F - i ( l — w(l + r)/p)}, and the demand distnhu-
t— hnction F(.) is CIFR, then the profit function of the supplier Ul{w) is 
unimodal over this range ofw. 
Proof. First, taking the first derivative ofsupplier's profit function w.r.p 
to w yields 
( r n M ) ' = g ' w f ( i + r)F(s(w))L + | W ) - c ] . • 
\ \ Q'—V ) 
To prove it is unimodal, we only need to prove that 
(a.) if wQ\w) + Q{w) > 0, then dWJdw > 0; 
(b.) if wQ'{w) + Q{w) < 0，then 1^“— is unimodal. 
Because we have proved that when w is less than or equal to some spe-
cific number, wQ'{w) + Q{w) will be greater than zero, which means 11, 
S 
increases first and then becomes a unimodal function, which implies that 1¾ 
a unimodal function. • 
It is easy to see that part {a.) is true, so we omit the proof here. Now we 
focus on part (b.). Because Q'(w) is less than zero, to prove the unimodality, 
we only need to show the term in the bracket is increasing, which is equivalent 
to show that F(6(w)) (^w + Q(w)/Q'(w)^ is increasing. Furthermore, we 
know in this case, wQ\w) + Q(w) < 0, which implies w + Q(w)/Q'(w) > 0 
and F{6{w)) is an increasing function of w, therefore we only need to show 
that when wQ'{w) + Q{w) < 0, w + Q{w)/Q'{w) is also increasing. 
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Now we analyze this term in detail, we have 
Q{^) = ^^(1 + rfQ(w)f[5[w)) - p'Q{w)f(Q(w)) 
Q'(w) — (1 + r)pF(6(w)) — w(l + ryf{6{w))Q(w) 
_ i ^ Q w m - ^ r Q H m ) 
- ^ " ( i - ， i s — " ^ 
/u;(l+r) f(6(w)) _ f{Q{w)) \ 
=Q(w)w)‘项“)）汽仏州) 
( 1 - ^ ¾ . ) ) 
< 0. 
Because of IFR, we know the numerator is always negative, and we also know 
A A , 
that Q(w)/Q {w) is negative, then it is easy to see that the denominator must 
be non-negative, that is, 
- T f > ) j 
Following the previous analysis, to prove the unimodality, we need to show 
that 
切 + | ^ 二 ^  ( 1 - g H ^ ) / f i — ! ^ g n i i M l ^ > 0 
Q H V F{Q{w))j/ V P w � ) m ^ J 
is increasing. We have proved that denominator is non-negative, therefore 
the numerator should be also non-negative, i.e., 
J l - g H ^ U o . 
V mH)J 一 
By taking derivative, we have 
(”’ + 麵 丫 — 」 - 加 ) 纖 , , f A W ) 
1 � M ) 、 - ， _ • ( ( 1 - ， _ ” ， • 
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where 
A M = 普 ) ( ¾ ¾ ¾ + - ( ^ ! ^ ) ' ) ( 1 — ^ ^ ^ 加 ) ® ! 、 
V(Q{w)) ^F(Q{w))) ； V V ^�^F{^[w))) 
+ 1 ± ! ： ( 暴 ) + 6 — ) ) ( f f i U ^ ^ ^ _ ( M ! ^ ^ V ) 
P V � , V � " V n 5 ( — ) P ^^^\F(5{w)))) 
• ( “ „ 幽 ) . 
V F(Q{w))) 
Because we have shown that the first term is non-negative, we only need to . 
prove that A(i/;) is also non-negative. And it is easy to verify that 
(1). -Q\w) > 0, (1 + r)[wQ'{w) + Q{w))|p < 0 and 
Q'{w)l > | i ^ ( ^ o ' w + O H ) . 
(2). Because of IFR and CIFR, 
M ^ + A z ^ ) f Z ^ ) ' > / ( ^ W ) , M i + r ) . / / ( ^ M ) y 
F ( Q M ) ^ ^ ^ H F ( O H ) J > ~ M ) + ~ ^ 0 ( — ( ? ^ ) " . 
(3). Because we assume the demand distribution function is CIFR, 
1 — 咖 加 ^ ^ ^ 〉 1 一 _ 幽 
P F{5(w)) F{Q(w)) _ 
which implies that A{w) is non-negative. • 
Compared to the bank loan case, the trade credit case is more compli-
cated because the financing decision of the retailer not only affects his own 
payoff, but also makes the supplier, the Stackelberg game leader involved 
with the credit risk. With this risk sharing effect, as long as the retailer 
raises a loan, the supplier's wholesale price decision ends differently and the 
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performance of the supply chain will be different. 
Similar to the bank loan case, the supplier's payoff function is piecewise 
with at most five pieces. Its shape is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
/.n, 
z ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ： ^ ? ^ ^ - — 
, z " " V ^ t ； i \ i \ Unconstrained 
z / i i i i \l \ 
, , J r / \ \ \ Constrained 
/ /*' 丨 i\ \ 
丨/ / / 丨丨 丨 j 丨、、、\ Borrowing 
/ y ^ i \ \ Trade Credit 
/ i | I I I i \ \ L 1 
i ^ : e - ^ ~ i — — L J — > w 
W] Ws Wt W0W4 W2 
I 
Figure 5.3: Single Period Supplier's Profit Function in Trade Credit Setting 
Theorem 5.1.8. (A similar result is derived by Kouvelis and Zhao (2008)) 
� Ifw4 = -00, the supplier's profit function T^(w) is unimodal; otherwise, 
ifw4 > -00，n^(ii;) is a Bi-modal function ofw. 
(b) The supplier's optimal wholesale price w^ is characterized in the fol-
lowing. 
� U^2 = -00, then the optimal wholesale price w: = wo-
(沟 Ifw4 = - 0 0 but there exists some W2 > -00, then the optimal wholesale ‘ 
price w* = w2. 
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(ii) If there w4 > -00, then 
-ifwo e [w1,w2], the optimal wholesale price, w^, will be either W2 
or Wt； 
-ifw()祭[wi,w2], the optimal wholesale price, wl, will be either wo 
or Wt； 
where Wt is defines as 
wt = max{i / ; e [w3,w4] ： cQ'{w) (5.1.8) 
= ( 1 + r)F(^(wQ{w) - k){l + r ) / p ) {wQ'{w) + •—))}. 
Proof. The proof is very similar to that in the bank loan case, so we 
omit it here. 
From the above theorem, we see that the structure of the optimal whole-
sale price in the trade credit setting is similar to that in the bank loan setting. 
Comparing the supplier's optimal decisions between the basic setting and the 
bank loan or the trade credit setting, we can obtain the following result. 
Proposition 5.1.9. wl < w* and w^ < w*. 
Proof. We prove the result for three different cases. 
(i) Ifw2 = -00, which means, regardless of the wholesale price, the retailer 
has sufficient initial capital so that his procurement decision will never 
be constrained. In this situation, w^ = w* — Wg. 
(ii) If W4 = -00, but W2 > —00, which means the retailer's decision may 
be constrained but he will not raise a debt. In this case, still, wl = 
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w* = W2, because whether borrowing externally is allowed or not does 
not make any difference. 
(iii) Except the two cases above, it may be profitable for the retailer to raise 
a loan. In this case, define 
n = {w : k/w < F_i(l w(l + r)/p)j . 
When retailer decides to borrow, i.e., w^ e Q. Because w* is greater 
than any point in Q. i.e. w^ > w*. 口 
Indeed, when the retailer is capable of doing external financing, the sup-
plier will always set a smaller wholesale price to induce the retailer to order 
more even if the supplier bears the retailer's default risk. This also suggests 
the double marginalization effect is reduced in the bank loan or the trade 
credit setting as compared to in the basic setting. 
When the interest rates provided by the bank and by the supplier are the 
same, the key factor that determines the retailer's financing channel is the 
wholesale price. So it is interesting to compare the optimal wholesale prices 
between these two different financing schemes. For a given wholesale price, 
if the retailer does not rely on any external fund, it is clear that the supplier 
feels indifferent between the bank loan and the trade credit case. Therefore, 
from the previous analysis, for a w such that F~\l~w{l + r)/p) > k/w, the 
supplier's profits are the same under these two cases. Next we will focus on 
the wholesale price w at which the retailer raises fund from external sources. 
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Proof. To compare the optimal solution of these two cases, we compare 
the first-order derivative of the profit function. Taking derivative yields 
dUl{w)|dw = Q{w) + wQ{w)' - cQ[w)' = 0, 
dYi[{w)|dw = {l + r){Q{w) + wQ{w)')F {(切如卜叫…))_cQ'(w). 
\ P ) 
We have proved that Q{w) is decreasing in w, therefore when dUl{w)/dw = 0, 
Q + wQ' < 0. To have w; < iyJ, it is sufficient to verify that dU,l{w)/dw < 
dU^^(w)/dw. From the equations above, dUl(w)/dw < dU^^{w)/dw if and 
only if 
(1 + r)F{{wQ(w) 一 k)(l + r)/p) > 1. 
Because we know that Q(w) satisfies 
p(l - F(Q(w))) = w(l + r)F((wQ(w) - k)(l + r)/p), 
obviously, the condition can be rewritten as if pF{Q(w))/w > 1. As nJ(w;) 
and nJ,(u;) are both unimodal functions in this case, pF[Q{wl)|wl > 1 
implies w; < wl- • 
When the retailer finances externally, the supplier sets a lower wholesale 
price in the trade credit case than in the bank loan case if the retailer orders 
less than the newsvendor solution given the wholesale price wl. 
5.2 Two-Period Problem 
In this section, we consider the supplier's problem in the two-period setting. 
We assume the supplier offers a single wholesale price contract in which the 
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term is two periods, and announces it at the beginning of the first period. 
However, under the two-period setting, the interaction between the retailer 
and the supplier becomes a dynamic Stackelberg game in which there may ex-
ist multiple solutions, and extremely difficult to solve. Therefore, we present 
the mathematical formulations in this section. Related numerical study will 
be presented in the next chapter. 
Depending on the retailer's best response we have derived in Sections 4.2 
and 4.3，the realization of demand in the first period will certainly affect the 
ordering decision of the retailer in the second period. As a result, different 
from the traditional "selling to the newsvendor" supplier who faces determin-
istic orders, the profit of the supplier in our dynamic setting is also affected 
by the demand uncertainty to some extent. In addition, in both the basic 
and the bank loan setting, the supplier does not play a role as a debt-holder, 
therefore, the procurement cost is always fully paid regardless whether the 
retailer is forced into bankruptcy or not. Since we ignore the time value 
of cash, the supplier's objective function in this two-period problem can be 
formulated as the following: 
m ， {w - c){Ql{w) + Ez),g;(w;,Di)), (5.2.1) 
I 
where Q*(w) is substituted by Q^*{w) in bank loan setting. 
In contrast, in trade credit financing, the supplier not only issues the 
contract but also offers credit to the budget constrained retailer. As a debt 
holder, she collects interests and bears credit risks. In one case, if demands 
are sufficiently high, the supplier collects both the payment for the products 
and interests, . 
w{QiH + Ql*{w)) + B;*(^^)n + Bl*{w)r^. 
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If unfortunately, the retailer is unable to pay off the loan(s), the supplier 
only receives the residual value of the retailer, that is 
k + B,{w) + B2{w)-w{QWw) + Qt(w)) +pmm{Q{*{w),D,) +pmm{Q'*{w),D2}. 
As the result for two above cases, the final formulation of the supplier's 
optimization problem can be written as: 
max Eo, (E^?? min !^k + Bi{w) + B2(w) - w{Q{*(w) + Ql*{w)) 
+p mm{Q{*(w), D：} + pmin{Ql*(w), D2}, w{Q\*(w) + Ql*(w)) 
+B;*Mn + Bl*{w)r2] - cQt{w^ - cQ\\w). 
5.3 Summary 
In this section, we study the supplier's problem in the capital constrained 
supply chain under three financing schemes. We characterize the structure 
of her optimal wholesale prices in the single-period setting. Furthermore, 




Numerical Study and Insights 
In this chapter, we conduct numerical experiments for the analytical models 
in the previous chapters to generate further managerial insights. In §6.1 we 
study the single period problem, where the issues we concern include the 
retailer's and the supplier's optimal decisions, the supply chain efficiency, 
etc. In §6.2, we focus on the retailer's problem in the two-period setting. 
The impacts of different financing schemes and dynamics on the retailer's 
optimal decisions will be discussed. 
6.1 The Single Period Supply Chain 
In this section, we discuss the impact of capital constraints on the supply 
chain in the single period setting. The default parameters are as follows. We 
choose the market demand to be a normal distribution with mean “ = 10 and 
standard deviation a = 2 or 4. We set the unit price of the product p = 10, 
and the production cost c = 3.5. The loan interest rate r = 5% or 10% and . 
the initial capital level k = 30. In the experiments, we will vary some of the 
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parameters while keeping the others fixed as default. 
6.1.1 Impact of Different Financing Schemes 
optimal Q optimal Q 
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Figure 6.1: Impact of initial capital on optimal procurement quantity 
Figure 6.1 depicts the retailer's optimal procurement quantity as a func-
tion of his initial capital level under the optimal wholesale price offered by 
the supplier. In each subplot, when the initial capital of the retailer is low, 
he seeks for external loans or credits extended by the supplier. As the initial 
capital increases, the optimal ordering quantity drops down and coincides 
with the one in the basic setting (which also reflects a jump of the optimal 
wholesale price between the two peaks, as we will see later). If the capital 
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level is sufficiently high, the financial constraint of the retailer becomes re-
dundant. Interestingly, when the standard deviation of the market demand 
is large (a = 4)，the financial constrained retailer orders less than the uncon-
strained ordering level when the interest rate is low (r = 5%), while he tends 
to order more when the interest rate is high (r = 10%). One of the possible 
explanations is that because when the market demand is more volatile and 
the loan rate is relatively high, the retailer is desperate to order more so that 
he can catch as much revenue as possible, while in other cases, the retailer 
is more rational. It is also worth mentioning that in the top left subplot, 
the optimal ordering quantity of the retailer in the trade credit case is not 
always larger than that in the bank loan case. When the retailer's initial 
capital level is very low, he orders more when his financing source is a bank. 
In addition, the cross point increases in the standard deviation of the demand 
and decreases in the interest rate level. 
Figure 6.2 shows the supplier's optimal wholesale price in the {w, k) space. 
The jump-up in each subplot reflects the switch between the two peaks, which 
we have mentioned in Theorem 5.1.4 and 5.1.8. As the demand standard 
deviation increases or as the interest rate decreases, the range in which the 
supplier offers a higher wholesale price in trade credit than in the bank loan 
case expands. 
We also study the impact of interest rate on the optimal decisions of 
the retailer and the supplier. It follows from Figure 6.3 that the retailer's 
optimal procurement quantity is decreasing in the interest rate provided by 
the bank or the supplier, which is very intuitive. On the other hand, the 
optimal wholesale price is non-monotone in the interest rate. Intuitively, 
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Figure 6.2: Impact of initial capital on optimal wholesale price 
as the interest rate increases, the supplier will lower the wholesale price to 
induce the retailer to order more. However, iri the bottom left subp]ot, where 
the retailer has a relatively high initial cash level, there is an upward jump 
which implies that it is no longer profitable for the supplier to induce the 
retailer to raise any loan, because she can make enough profit from his initial 
cash. It is worth mentioning that the optimal wholesale price in the trade 
credit case jumps at a higher interest rate, because the supplier, as a debt 
holder in this case, is more likely to set a lower wholesale price to induce 
the retailer to borrow money from her such that she would benefit frorri the 
interests. From the right panel, we also observe that among different interest 
rates, there is no dominant financing scheme for the retailer in terms of his 
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Figure 6.3: Impact of interest rate on optimal procurement quantity and 
optimal wholesale price 
profit, since the optimal wholesale price in the bank loan case may or may 
not be larger than that in the trade credit case. When r is sufficiently low, 
the supplier offers a lower wholesale price in the bank loan case, and the 
retailer orders more accordingly. This is because when the demand variance 
is large but interest earned by trade credit is relatively low, the supplier will 
avoid taking risk by increasing the wholesale price a bit compared to that in 
the bank loan case. 
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Figure 6.4: Impact of initial capital on supply chain efficiency 
6.1.2 Supply Chain Efficiency 
In this section, we examine how the financial constraints affect the supply 
chain performance and whether the loss of channel efficiency can be reduced 
by appropriately financing the retailer. 
To see the impacts of financial constraint on the supply chain's profit, we 
plot the supply chain efficiency with respect to the initial capital level of the 
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retailer in Figure 6.4, where the supply chain efficiency is defined as follows: 
rr^  . total supply chain profit 
emciency = =^^ x 100% 
total supply chain profit without retailer's constraint • 
From each subplot we observe that in the basic setting, the supply chain 
efficiency is strictly increasing in the initial capital level. Moreover, when the 
retailer's initial cash level is very low, the efficiency can be even lower than 
15%，which indicates the significant impacts of retailer's financial constraints. 
Intuitively, financing, no matter by bank loan or by trade credit, provides the 
constrained retailer an opportunity to achieve the unconstrained operational 
decisions, therefore, the performance will be always better than in the basic 
setting, which is confirmed in our experiments. 
We also find that, in the three subplots on the left, where the standard 
deviation of the demand is relatively low, i.e., a = 2, the supply chain always 
performs better in the trade credit case. In addition, when the initial capital 
level is not high, as the interest rate becomes higher, the difference between 
the efficiencies in the bank loan case and that in the trade credit case becomes 
larger. The reason behind is: if the supplier is the debt holder, she will offer a 
lower wholesale price to reduce the default risk due to the high interest rate, 
which gives the retailer an incentive to order more and results in a higher 
supply chain efficiency. On the other hand, if the debt holder is an external 
intermediary, higher interest rate incurs more internal cash flowing out of 
the supply chain, which certainly lowers the efficiency. Observing from the 
three subplots on the right in Figure 6.4，the supply chain under the trade 
credit scheme may not always achieve a higher performance than under the 
bank financing scheme when the variance of the demand is large. When the . 
interest rate is low (r = 5%), the supply chain performs better in the bank 
78 
ff 
Chapter 6 Numerical Study and Insights 
loan case if the initial cash of the retailer is sufficiently low. Intuitively, when 
the value of risk is higher than the interests paid, the supply chain is always 
better off if the debt holder is someone outside the supply chain. 
6.2 Capital Constrained Retailer in Two-Period 
Setting 
In this section, we numerically examine the retailer's optimal strategy under 
the two-period setting. Since it is practically difficult to approach a two-
dimensional dynamic programming with a continuous state space, we choose 
the market demand in each period to be discrete-uniformly distributed be-
tween 0 and 9. We set selling price p = 9，the wholesale price w = 4, and 
interest rate r = 10%, which is identical between two periods. 
6.2.1 Impacts of Different Financial Schemes on the 
Retailer 
First we investigate the retailer's optimal ordering decision under different 
financing schemes. Figure 6.5 illustrates his optimal ordering quantity with 
respect to his initial cash level. As we can see from this figure, the retailer 
who is able to do financing always orders more than he does in the basic 
setting. When the retailer has very limited initial cash, he orders even more 
than the optimal newsvendor ordering quantity. This is because once the 
retailer facing very tight financing constraint borrows, he bears essentially 
high credit risk, and therefore, he has to order more to capture as much 
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Figure 6.5: Optimal Ordering in the First Period v.s. Initial Cash Level 
revenue as possible to pay off his debt. Interestingly, as his initial cash level 
is in the low middle range, the retailer in the bank loan setting keeps on 
ordering more, while in the trade credit case, his ordering quantity drops 
to the unconstrained optimal quantity Qo. Intuitively, the retailer in the 
trade credit setting only cares about this period, since no matter how bad 
his financial status is in the beginning of the second period, he still has an 
opportunity to borrow. However, in the bank loan case, the retailer does not 
have the second chance to raise loans, as a result, he is more aggressive in 
his procurement decision. 
Figure 6.6 shows the retailer's optimal profit efficiency as a function of 
his initial cash level. Note that in this figure, the efficiency 0 is defined as 
follows. 
丄 Retailer's optimal profit . 
办=p • ., , , • � — — — X 100%, 
Retailer s unconstrained profit 
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Figure 6.6: Efficiency v.s. Initial Cash Level 
where the retailer's unconstrained profit is obtained by optimizing the same 
objective function of the retailer without considering the financial constraints. 
As this figure reveals, the retailer's optimal profits in all three cases are in-
creasing in k, which is intuitive, and the retailer’ payoffs are much better in 
the bank loan and the trade credit case than that in the basic setting, which 
demonstrates the significant impact of the financial status on the retailer's 
profitability. We also notice that for the cash constrained retailer, the trade 
credit financing scheme dominates the other two. Hence, we draw a conclu-
sion that under two-period setting, the retailer always prefers trade credit 
when the wholesale price is exogenous given. 
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6.2.2 Saving for the Future 
Under the multi-period bank loan setting, intuitively, the retailer will save 
some cash for the future use. Figure 6.7 shows the retailer's saving amount 
as a function of his initial cash level. We define the saving for the future 5 
6 
14 -
12 声• » • lL 
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Figure 6.7: Cash Saving v.s. Initial Cash Level 
by the following formula. 
5 二 k + h\ — wQ* 
The interesting result is that the retailer's saving amount is not monotone in 
k. He cares more about next period when his initial capital level is moderate. 
The reason is when the retailer is facing a very tight financing constraint, he 
is exposed to a very high risk of bankruptcy so that he may be too desperate 
to plan for the future. In contrast, if the retailer has sufficient cash on hand, 
he does not have to save much for the future since most likely his revenue . 
would be able to cover his next period's procurement cost. 
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6.2.3 Comparison of the Single- and Two-Period Set-
tings 
Next we compare the retailer's optimal ordering quantities of the single-
period and the two-period case. Figure 6.8 plots the ordering quantities in 
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• Trade Credit 
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Figure 6.8: Optimal Ordering Quantity - Single Period v.s. Two Period 
the basic setting (left panel) and in the settings in which the r6tailer has 
financing opportunities (right panel), as a function of his initial cash. From 
these figures, the retailer orders more in the single period setting in both 
cases. The intuition for this is that the retailer in the multi-period setting 
is always so conservative that orders less (weak sense) comparing to he does 
in the single-period case. As the retailer's initial cash increases, his optimal 
ordering quantity in the two-period financing setting reaches newsvendor 
solution earlier than in the single-period case. This is because the retailer is 
less sensitive to the tightness of financial constraints due to the extra earning 
opportunity in the second period. 
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Conclusion and Future 
Research 
Finance plays a vital role in running a business. Lack of capital severely de-
creases a company's profitability and such harm may ultimately plague the 
entire supply chain. In this thesis, we make several contributions to the litera-
ture of supply chain models with financial constraints. Specifically, we study 
a supply chain model with a capital constrained retailer. We investigated 
the impacts of financial constraints and different financing schemes on the 
profitability of the retailer, the supplier and the supply chain, and how the 
retailer and the supplier should optimally react to the financial constraint. 
We first study the retailer's problem for a given wholesale price and bank 
loan/trade credit interest rate. We find that in the single period setting, the 
retailer's profit is unimodal in his ordering quantity and financial decision if 
the demand distribution has an increasing failure rate. We also demonstrate 
that, in the presence of bank loan or trade credit, the retailer's optimal 
84 
• 
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Research 
ordering quantity may not be monotone in his initial budget. We then extend 
this problem to a two-period dynamic setting. Under the assumption that 
the demand has a log-concave density, we show the retailer's profit function 
is still unimodal in his ordering quantity and financial decision. Such result 
can be extended to the general multi-period setting and is very important 
for the retailer to maximize his profit. 
Next we study how the supplier decides an optimal wholesale price to • 
maximize her profit given the retailer is financial constrained. Since the 
supplier's problem in a two period setting is a dynamic Stackelberg game 
and is in general intractable, we only focus on the single period setting. We 
show that in the basic setting where the retailer is unable to raise fund, the 
supplier's profit is unimodal and the optimal wholesale price is always at 
least as the optimal wholesale price when the retailer is unconstrained. In 
the bank loan and trade credit case, we show that the supplier's objective 
function has at most two modes. It means that the supplier will either set a 
wholesale price such that the retailer will use up his capital without exerting 
external financing or a smaller wholesale price to encourage the retailer to 
seek financial help and order more. 
To gain more managerial insights, we conduct several numerical studies. 
Our main findings are that if the interest rate of bank loan and trade credit 
are the same and exogenously given, then there is no dominating financial 
scheme for the retailer, i.e. the retailer may prefer bank loan to trade credit, 
or vise versa, depending on his initial capital. For the supply chain, its total 
profit is much larger when the retailer can seek external financing than that 
when the retailer can not. 
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In the future, we intend to investigate other common used financing 
schemes such as bonds with dividends and securities, and the impacts of 
market imperfections on trade credit and bank financing channels. It is also 
of interest to research the capital structure and operations management in-
terface under the long term setting. 
In our model, we assume all the debts are repaid at the end of the second 
period. It is also very interesting to study the case the loans are settled in 
each period. In this situation, the borrower can be bankrupt at the end of 
each period and the ending time of the planning horizon will be stochastic. 
Another possible extension is to address the information asymmetry issue. 
Through our model, we assume that initial budget of the retailer is a public 
information that is available to all players in the supply chain. In reality, 
however, this may not be true. As a result, in trade credit practice, the 
supplier may not be able to offer the optimal contract terms, and retailer 
may misrepresent his initial capital to obtain a more favorable contract and 
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Appendix A Log-concavity of Some Common Distributions 
Common Distributions 
Distribution Log-Concave (Density) IFR 
Uniform yes yes 
Normal yes yes 
Chi-Squared yes yes 
Exponential yes yes 
Laplace yes yes 
Weibull (c > 1) yes yes 
Power Function (/3 > 1) yes yes 
Gamma (m > 1) yes yes 
Beta (a > 1,6 > 1) yes yes 
T log-concave on the interval (0,1), 
Log Normal no 
log-convex on the interval (l,oo) 
Power Function (p < 1) log-convex no 
Weibull (c < 1) log-convex no 
Gamma (m < 1) log-convex no 
Beta {a = 0.5, b = 0.5) log-convex no 
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